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Publisher’s Note
The 2012 Brigham Young University Prelaw Review (the “Journal”), like other volumes in the past, continues to demonstrate
Brigham Young University’s commitment to excellence in scholarship and student development. Throughout this past year it has been
a privilege to work with ambitious students who want to produce the
best possible undergraduate legal journal.
Continuing the vision of the Journal, this year’s staff has worked
arduously to present professional and current legal scholarship.
As undergraduates, the depth and breadth of the topics addressed
required that these students do much more than just editing. The
authors and editors studied to find court cases and law review articles to support their arguments. During the year, as new information
became available, authors and editors continually updated and refocused their arguments to provide timely discussions of the current
issues. Consequently, each of these articles reflects the latest decisions from the courts and scholarship from the legal community.
It is always the goal to produce a reputable legal journal. However, this experience also provides the opportunity for members of
the staff to prepare themselves for future professional scholarship
and work in the legal field. Each student has become proficient in
the Bluebook system of legal citations, and all have spent countless
hours editing and source checking each other’s legal articles. The
students have also learned to analyze pressing issues, incorporate
legal citations, and present cogent legal arguments, while receiving
training in journal publishing. These students leave the 2012 edition of
this Journal possessing the ability to excel in law and other professional pursuits.
We continue to be grateful for the endowment from the Rawlinson Family Foundation that funds the Journal and the support of
Brigham Young University’s resources to create and print this publication. As you read the topics addressed in this Journal, I am sure
that you will agree that this is an impressive work produced by these
v

BYU undergraduate authors and editors. It continues to be a pleasure to work with such fine individuals and students on a daily basis.
Kris Tina Carlston, J.D., MBA
Prelaw Advisor, BYU
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Editor-In-Chief & Managing Editor’s Note
We are extremely grateful for the daunting yet exciting task of
managing the 2012 BYU Prelaw Review. It is hard to describe to an
outside observer the transformative process the journal goes through
over the course of two semesters: a melting-pot of students from
different majors and papers that may not be any more than just a
good idea somehow converge into a well-oiled editing machine and
a polished body of compelling legal academia. We recognize that
this transformation did not happen by magic but rather by the help
of talented and hard-working team members. After spending eight
months working with and learning from these individuals, we feel
like we gained much more than we gave.
We would like to thank each of our individual authors and editors. The authors came onto the team with interesting and exciting
ideas and worked tirelessly make those ideas a concrete product.
We are grateful for the way they managed their teams and listened
respectfully to suggestions from us and from their editors. Our editors were probably the most qualified and talented group of editors
the Prelaw Review has ever had, and we appreciate the way they
dealt with high-pressure deadlines and unforeseen setbacks. We
would also like to thank our authors and editors for their efforts outside of class to boost the quality of next year’s team through vigorous
advertising and fundraising.
Special thanks go out to our Senior Staff Editor Andrew Bean
for going above and beyond his responsibilities and single-handedly
doing a job that should have taken three people to do. The proactive way he took the lead on everything ranging from fundraising to
advertising to giving individual writing help to editing groups was
always welcome and needed. And without the InDesign help of his
wife, Laura, we would have been completely lost in formatting and
publishing the journal.
Lastly, we would like to thank our advisor and publisher, Kris
Tina Carlston. Her tireless guidance and thoughtful suggestions
vii

were just what we needed to maintain the highest quality in the journal and help students master the skills of legal research and writing.
Dane Thorley				Noah Driggs
Editor-in-Chief				
Managing Editor

The “Mysteries of Human Life”1: Dealing with
an Ambiguous Right to Privacy
Brian Reed2

I

I. Introduction

n 1919, the American philosopher Zechariah Chafee told the
story of a peculiar case brought before a judge. The defendant
was a man accused of hitting another man in the nose. Pleading
his case to the judge, the defendant asked whether he had the right
to swing his arms in a free country. The judge responded with this
statement: “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other
man’s nose begins.” 3
Nearly one hundred years have passed since this story was told,
yet the importance of individual rights and their limitations has only
increased. Indeed, the metaphorical line separating where one man’s
right applies and where it does not has become increasingly more
complicated to distinguish.4 Nevertheless, the point of the story is
clear: there are limits to individual rights.
This is particularly true in the context of the right to privacy.
Laws and regulations initially seen as appropriate, even expedient,
are later seen as blatant violations of privacy. Laws protecting social
norms face this challenge. As social norms develop and evolve,
1

Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).

2

Brian is a junior studying political science and economics at Brigham
Young University. He plans to attend law school in the fall of 2013.
Afterwards, Brian plans to work in corporate law, and perhaps also in
business consulting. Thank you to Gerrit Winkel, Andrew Christensen,
Ashley Gengler, Kyle Patterson, and James Tringham, who each provided
exceptional guidance and assistance as this paper was being written. It
would not have made the progress it has without their help.

3

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv. L. Rev.
932, 957 (1919).

4

See United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 945 (2011).
1

2
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the laws protecting established norms frequently restrict developing ones (such is the case with gay marriage, abortion, and even
physician assisted suicide). Further, while many judicial opinions
acknowledge that privacy is a legitimate individual right, privacy is
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. In addition, an appeal
to judicial opinions does not settle the definition of privacy; among
legal philosophers and scholars, the conceptual definition of privacy
is also vague and contested.5 In short, although interpretation of the
Constitution reasonably allows for a right to privacy, there is no consensus on the correct interpretation, and certainly no consensus on
an explicit definition.6
Despite the lack of consensus, the effect of the right to privacy
cannot be understated. Some of the most significant Supreme Court
cases of the last century have been decided in the name of the right to
privacy.7 While judges support the existence of the right to privacy
with various interpretations of constitutional amendments, academics attempt to further define the right to privacy by enumerating what
it allows and where it applies. Considering the perpetual evolution
of privacy issues along with the unsettled definition of the right to
privacy, the important question becomes: How will we know when
the right to privacy should not be expanded?
Rather than contribute to the already sizable literature on whether the right to privacy exists or what the right to privacy allows, my
5

See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 95 (1690) available
at EBSCOhost (“By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.”); see also John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (David
Spitz, ed. 2007);Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale
L.J. 421 (1980); Jeffrey L. Johnson, Constitutional Privacy, 13 Law and
Philosophy 161; Johnathan O’Neill, Shaping Modern Constitutional
Theory: Bickel and Bork Confront the Warren Court, Review of Politics
325, 325-351 (2003).

6

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

7

See Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
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argument highlights the limits of the right to privacy, or what privacy should not allow. I acknowledge that privacy is a legitimate right
reasonably implied in the Constitution and established in numerous
Supreme Court cases. Yet less attention is given to limitations of this
right. In my argument, I will show that the right to privacy should
be maximized, but I will also show that expansion beyond privacy’s
proper “point of maximization” will decrease individual rights, even
(ironically) the right to privacy itself. Given the abstract, conflicting
definitions of the right to privacy, my argument identifies limitations in
previous court rulings (and the reasons behind these limitations) that
should be generalized and applied to future cases concerning the
right to privacy. These limitations will serve to solidify the definition of the right to privacy in the future.

The Evolution of Privacy in the Constitution:
As illustrated in what follows, interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment have shaped the right to privacy for more than a century. The Due Process Clause, contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was originally intended to prevent the violation
of individual rights without proper legal actions in the context of
outlawing slavery.8 The purpose of the Due Process Clause was
quickly expanded (and rightly so) to prohibit and prevent any form
of violation of individual rights without proper legal action. While
the changes introduced with this new legislation were needed and
appropriate, its vague wording has also provided justification for a
dramatic expansion of individual rights, perhaps even beyond the
amendment’s original intent. This section explores the evolution of
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and, specifically, how
it relates to the right to privacy.

II. The Lochner Era
The earliest instance in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
used to justify the right to privacy occurred in 1905 in Lochner

8

See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 26, 2012

4

v. New York.9 The case involved a baker who contracted with an
employee to work more than the maximum number of hours allowed
under New York law. Although intended to protect individuals from
harm caused by exposure to unsafe and hazardous work environments, the law was challenged because it restricted an individual’s
privacy to buy and sell labor (in this context labor was considered an
individual’s possession).10 In the majority opinion, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down the New York law saying,
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Under that provision no state can
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part
of the liberty protected by this amendment.11
Lochner’s appeal to the Due Process Clause established a precedent
that was repeatedly cited in cases throughout the early twentieth century, invalidating numerous economic and labor regulations. Soon
after Lochner, in Adair v. United States, the Due Process Clause was
applied to uphold a “yellow-dog contract” (prohibiting employees
from forming a union).12 Interestingly, while the Due Process Clause
was used in Lochner to strike down state legislation limiting the
“right to contract,” the same clause was used in Adair to protect legislation preserving the right to contract.
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which
he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.
9

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).

10

See id. at 54.

11

See id. at 53.

12

See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 192 (1908).
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So the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer,
for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer,
for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employee.13
Although the context of Adair is different from Lochner, it represents yet another protection of an individual’s privacy, specifically
the right to contract. According to Adair, just as employees had the
privacy to sell their labor for however many hours as they saw fit—
regardless of how unwise such action may be—employers had the
privacy to determine the conditions under which they will purchase
an employee. Though the actions of employer and employee may
be unwise, it was deemed unconstitutional for the government to
interfere.14
As an epilogue to Adair, the Supreme Court again protected
employers’ privacy to create yellow-dog contracts in Coppage v.
Kansas. The majority opinion, by Justice Pitney, stated:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune. . . . It is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that
are the necessary result of the exercise of [the freedom of
contract and the right of private property] . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment, in declaring that a State shall not “deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law,” gives to each of these an equal sanction; it recognizes
“liberty” and “property” as co-existent human rights, and
debars the States from any unwarranted interference with
either.15

13

Id. at 174-175.

14

See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908).

15

Coppage v. Kansas. 236 US 1, 17 (1915).
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At this time, the Supreme Court appeared to reach a consensus that
the right to privacy did in fact include the right to contract and that
this right found its place in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause, however, was not the only support
for court rulings against economic regulation during the Lochner
era. For example, the Supreme Court referred to the Tenth Amendment in Hammer v. Dagenhart and Carter v. Coal Company in order
to invalidate federal regulation of the economy. 16 Still, the precedent
for protecting economic privacy was largely a product of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment described above, which defined
privacy—in the context of the right to contract—as fundamentally
inherent in the Due Process Clause.

III. Post-Lochner Era
In the late 1930s, the Supreme Court shifted dramatically from
its Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause foundation for the
right to privacy. Under the Lochner era interpretation of privacy,
the federal government was prohibited from intervening in intrastate
economic activity (see Hammer v. Dagenhart).17 However, faced
with the crisis of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court chose
to nullify its previous interpretation of the Due Process Clause to
enable the passage of New Deal legislation. For instance, yellow-dog
contracts—previously protected by the Supreme Court—were outlawed in 1932 by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.18 As the attention of U.S.
16

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269 (1918); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291-292 (1936).

17

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-274 (1918) (The
grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce
was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it
authority to control the States in their exercise of the police power
over local trade and manufacture. The grant of authority over a
purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power
always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution).

18

29 U.S.C. §103 (1932).
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legislation and Court rulings shifted toward economic recovery, the
controversy over the definition of privacy faded into the background.
After the Depression, privacy again took center stage in numerous laws and court rulings. While the context of the privacy debate
was limited to economic privacies during the Lochner era, the
debate now focuses on social privacy. Without question, privacy in
the social and economic context is an important element of liberty.
Clearly, the right to privacy should be recognized in many situations,
yet the Supreme Court’s decision to allow New Deal legislation (in
effect, disregarding the privacy definition found in the Due Process
Clause) made it difficult to determine where to draw support for a
right to privacy in the Constitution.19 Even today, the controversy
over the answer to this question is apparent in a number of Supreme
Court decisions involving social privacy. While most recognize privacy, there is significant disagreement regarding the basis for the
existence of privacy as a right established in the Constitution.
Griswold v Connecticut is perhaps the most significant Supreme
Court decision expanding the right to privacy in the social context.
Griswold questioned whether the right to marital privacy was legitimate and, if so, was compromised by a Connecticut law prohibiting
the use of birth control. Established in 1879, this law had been challenged repeatedly, but had been upheld until Griswold in 1965. At
this time, the law was invalidated because according to the Court
it did violate the right to marital privacy. In this sense, Griswold
was revolutionary because it was the first unequivocal recognition of
privacy as a right inherent in the Constitution since the Lochner era,
thus bringing privacy back to the foreground of attention.
Although Griswold v. Connecticut established the legitimacy of
social privacy, it added to the ambiguity of the Constitutional definition of privacy. Despite the Court’s 7-2 decision, there were multiple
arguments about the source of privacy in the Constitution. While
most Justices agreed that privacy in marriage—and privacy in general—is a right protected by the Constitution, they differed on the
definition of privacy. In one of the most controversial definitions,
19

See Richard A. Glenn, the Right to Privacy: Rights and Liberties Under
the Law 38-44 (2003).
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Justice Douglas explained privacy’s existence in the Constitution
as follows:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. . . .
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment, in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘‘in any house’’
in time of peace without the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the ‘‘right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.’’ The Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”20
Though Douglas’ opinion certainly clarified the issue of marital privacy, his discussion of “emanations” and “penumbras” made it difficult to know where privacy does not apply. Adding to the ambiguous
definition of privacy, several other Justices provided concurring
opinions explaining their own definition of privacy. For instance,
Justice Goldberg refers to a marital privacy right “not confined to
the terms of the Bill of Rights,” but “supported both by numerous
decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court’s opinion, and by the
language and history of the Ninth Amendment.”21
In addition to the opinions of Goldberg and Douglas, Justice
Harlan wrote a third concurring opinion but argued that privacy
was inherent in the Due Process Clause, reverting back to the Loch20

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

21

Id. at 486-487.
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ner era definition of privacy. Harlan claimed that “the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.”22
Indeed, dissent among Supreme Court Justices is clear from
Griswold alone. Douglas claims that privacy comes from “emanations” and “penumbras” throughout the Constitution. Meanwhile,
Goldberg points to the Ninth Amendment and the Liberty Clause as
the source of privacy. Finally, Harlan disregards the Court’s previous
decision to invalidate the relationship between privacy and the Due
Process Clause, claiming due process as sufficient support for the
existence of privacy. Since Griswold, the debate over the source of
privacy in the Constitution has continued in other cases.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), Casey, citing Roe v.
Wade (1973), challenged five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. In response, the Supreme Court upheld the Roe v.
Wade ruling and invalidated the provisions in question. Explaining
their decision, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter claimed
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.23
Again, O’Connor’s opinion resolves any doubt regarding the defense
of privacy in the right to abortion, but it does not clarify where privacy should be limited. Recent debate surrounding the new health
care legislation suggests that issues relevant to privacy will continue
to evolve. As the government attempts to enforce a law demanding
that citizens buy health insurance, Supreme Court review of this leg22

Id. at 500.

23

Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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islation will be heavily influenced by the definition of privacy they
choose to support. According to the Lochner era Court rulings and
definition of the right to privacy, it is likely that such a provision
would be classified as economic regulation and deemed unconstitutional. However, if the Supreme Court chooses to emphasize the
socially concerned emanations and penumbras of the right to privacy, the outcome of its review could be significantly different.
Review of the recent health care legislation provides just one
example of the critical importance of a clearly defined right to privacy. Without a unified conclusion regarding the source of the right
to privacy in the Constitution, the Supreme Court risks arbitrary
expansion of the right to privacy beyond its proper point of maximization, even to the extent that privacy expansion may violate other
rights that are explicitly included in the Constitution. In an attempt
to clarify the limits of the right to privacy and establish the point of
maximization, I will identify a few instances in which the Supreme
Court has limited the right to privacy in specific circumstances. I
will then discuss how these context-specific limitations could be
used as general limitations for future privacy cases and legislation.

III. Limitations of Privacy
While there is plenty of discussion on whether privacy legally
exists and whether the right to privacy should apply to specific new
“zones of privacy,”24 there is significantly less discussion of the proper limitations of privacy. This may be because privacy is so difficult
to define, and specific limitations require a fixed, clear definition.
On the other hand, the disparity may exist because scholars are more
concerned with violations of individual privacy than they are with
instances of too much privacy (not many people will complain about
having too many privacy rights). An argument in favor of establishing
limits on privacy could even be misinterpreted as a threat, aiming
to take rights away from individuals. Nonetheless, limiting privacy
with the intent of maximizing it will yield the greatest amount of
utility. Though not often considered, it is possible for privacy—when
there is too much of it—to have a negative effect on society, as will
24

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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be shown in the following examples. In mathematics, identifying the
point of maximization on a bell curve is simple: find the highest
point on the curve or the point immediately before the values of the
graph begin to decrease. Alas, this concept is much more abstract in
the law. Therefore, it is important to study indicators of maximization, or instances when expanding the right to privacy to a new zone
would compromise other constitutional rights. Recognizing these
indicators will help, in turn, to recognize when the right to privacy
has approached its point of maximization. The decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg, Kelley v. Johnson, and Olmstead v. U.S. can
help us better identify indicators of maximization when considered
under a new light.

IV. The Equal Protection Limit
The emergence of physician assisted suicide illustrates the
expanding boundaries of privacy. Though physician assisted suicide is illegal in most states, the simple fact that the right to physician assisted suicide is considered shows that privacy is, indeed,
an evolving issue. In 1997, Dr. Harold Glucksberg petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Washington law prohibiting
physician assisted suicide.25 While the Washington law banned physician assisted suicide, it did allow a doctor to withhold life-sustaining treatment from a patient if the patient so desired. According to
Glucksberg, if a mentally competent, terminally ill patient could
elect to refuse life-sustaining treatment, then a patient should not
be prohibited from direct physician assisted suicide if the patient
so desires. In short, Glucksberg claimed that a patient’s right to
die with dignity and in peace should be considered a constitutional
right to privacy. Banning qualified patients from making this choice
placed an “undue burden”26 on the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Prior to the Supreme Court hearing, however, the Washington
law was overturned, then re-established upon a subsequent appeal.
25

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-706 1997.

26

See id. at 702.
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The case eventually reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. At
this point, the Circuit Court declared
After “[w]eighing and then balancing” this interest [the right
to physician assisted suicide] against Washington’s various
interests, the court held that the State’s assisted-suicide ban
was unconstitutional “as applied to terminally ill competent
adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians.”27
Once again, the Washington law was overturned. Indeed, the ambivalence surrounding Washington’s law on physician assisted suicide
reflects the difficulty found in establishing a proper limit on the right
to privacy.
Despite Glucksberg’s appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court limited
the right to privacy in large part to avoid a conflict with the Equal
Protection Clause, which states that “no state shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”28 After
surveying the legal history regarding suicide, the Court claimed that
in hundreds of years the law has never facilitated any form of taking life. Further defending the Court’s position, Justice Rehnquist
argued that there is a legitimate state interest to protect the sanctity of life, referring to the severe punishments in place for those
guilty of homicide. However, for the purposes of this discussion, the
most important reason for his decision was to preserve the rights of
those who would be disproportionately disadvantaged by the legalization of the right to privacy: “The State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled
persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.”29 Rehnquist cited the
decision in Cruzan v. Missouri along with research done by the New
York Task Force (a group created to investigate the potential consequences of physician assisted suicide in New York in the context
27

Id. at 709.

28

U.S. Const.amend. XIV, § 1.

29

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of Vacco v. Quil).30 From these sources, Rehnquist drew the conclusion that the legalization of physician assisted suicide would create
a legitimate, systematic bias against discrete and insular minorities,
specifically the poor and disabled. 31
Later arguments have strengthened Rehnquist’s equal protection rationale. According to Siegel, legalization of physician assisted suicide would place a significant disadvantage on the disabled
(1998). Theoretically, physician assisted suicide would create a legal
environment where it would be easier for the disabled to receive
assisted suicide than it would be for the non-disabled. Courts and physicians would be tempted to see the disabilities as medical conditions
which lower the quality of life. Bouvia v. Superior Court, McKay v.
Bergstedt, and Georgia v. McAfee provide examples of instances in
which the courts demonstrated unequal leniency in granting permission for assisted suicide to disabled plaintiffs.32 While the initial
ruling in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals called the supposed
threat against the disabled “ludicrous on its face,” the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the claim as a legitimate possibility. Based on the
persuasive influence of doctors over patients in terminal conditions,
the Court held that even subtle differences between the treatments
of disabled patients versus non-disabled patients would likely influence the decision to choose physician assisted suicide, increasing
the probability of suicide for those who are disabled (from the case
description Washington v. Glucksberg).33
In addition to disadvantages imposed on the disabled, legalized
physician assisted suicide would impose undue pressure on the lower

30

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 731 (1997).

31

See id. at 725.

32

See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d, Cal. Rprtr., 297 (1986);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 Nev. P. 2d, 617 (1990); State of Ga. v. McAfee,
385 Ga. S.E. 2d 651 (1989).

33

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702 — Supreme Court 1997. P.
725

14
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economic class.34 In an effort to lower the costs of palliative care
which would be charged to family members after they die, or simply
because the patient cannot afford the treatment costs that they would
receive from choosing alternative treatment, poorer citizens would
have greater economic incentives to choose assisted suicide than
middle or upper class citizens. Their economic position may even
bias the counsel given by physicians, making the physicians themselves more likely to suggest assisted suicide as a possible course
of action to lower class patients than middle or upper-class patients.
The disproportionate disadvantage placed on those in lower classes
and the disabled violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35
Recognizing that expanding the right to privacy would, in reality,
decrease the rights of the poor and disabled helps establish an important indicator of maximization. With other issues, it may be easier
to recognize when a new application of a constitutional right goes
too far. With privacy, however, this is more difficult. The Supreme
Court’s decision to weight the rights of the poor and disabled more
heavily than the privacy of those desiring physician assisted suicide can be generalized, making it easier to decide whether privacy
should be expanded. Thus, any expansion of privacy which compromises the Equal Protection Clause should be considered an indicator
of maximization. In these situations legislators and justices must be
especially mindful of the possibility that privacy may be close to its
point of maximization. Ironically, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been used more often as justification for
34

See Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The
Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments
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L. Rev.776, 785 (1998); see also New York State Department of Health,
When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical
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expansion of individual rights. However, in this context, it provides
justification against such an expansion. In this way, the Fourteenth
Amendment actually solidifies the right to privacy by providing a
limitation of privacy, rather than obscuring it as it has in other interpretations.36

V. The State Interest Limit
In 1976, Kelley brought a case all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court because he wanted to grow out his hair. The circumstances
may seem like a non-issue, except that Kelley was a member of the
Suffolk County Police Force in New York and as such was subject
to a strict grooming standard, regulating both hair length and style.
Kelley argued that the grooming standards were “not based upon
the generally accepted standard of grooming in the community.”37
Thus, the regulation violated his individual privacy to determine his
own appearance; this right was, according to Kelley, included in the
Fourteenth Amendment.38 When the case was first tried, the District Court of the Eastern District of New York dismissed the case;
however, upon appeal the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit
reversed the dismissal and invalidated the grooming standard. “The
Court of Appeals went on to decide that ‘choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual’s personal liberty’ and is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”39
Despite the case’s appeal to the right to privacy (alluded to in
the Fourteenth Amendment), the U.S. Supreme Court limited the
right to privacy in the interest of preserving the efficacy and cohesion of
the police force. The Court agreed that this interest outweighed and
overruled Kelley’s interest to preserve individual privacy. Again,
Rehnquist offered the majority opinion, explaining that an ordinary
citizen claiming violation of privacy may be justified in this context,
but because Kelley represented the Suffolk County Police Depart36
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ment, he was not to be treated as an ordinary citizen. Acknowledging the danger of treating government employees as some form of
lower-class citizen, Rehnquist defends his claim further:
More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon activities of both federal and state
employees lying at the core of the First Amendment. CSC
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First
Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive
regulations of state employees where the claim implicates
only the more general contours of the substantive liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision on this issue, the Second Circuit Court had dismissed the claim that grooming standards were
significantly related to the preservation of some “genuine public
need.”41 In response, Rehnquist held that the question at issue was
instead whether there was a reasonable, rational connection between
grooming standards and the protection of person and property.
That policemen would be more easily recognizable to members of
the public and would develop esprit de corps among the policemen
themselves was seen as sufficient rationale for upholding the grooming standard.
It should be clear that the Supreme Court was not advocating
for the removal of privacy; indeed, this would threaten even basic
liberties explicit in the Constitution, such as freedom of speech and
freedom of religion. Rather, the Supreme Court effectively elevated
the privacy of possessions for the general public above the privacy
of personal appearance for the individual. This ruling (along with
the ruling in Washington v. Glucksberg) shows that privacy can only
be expanded so far before it inevitably begins to compromise other
40

Id. at 245

41

Id. at 242

Right to Privacy

17

necessary, significant individual rights. In the context of Kelley v.
Johnson, the Supreme Court provides precedent for the limitation
of privacy when a proposed expansion would distort or decrease the
efficacy of government institutions designed to protect the person
and property of individuals.42 In this context, privacy (in the form
of grooming standards) must be limited for privacy’s sake (the person and property of individuals). Here again we find an indicator of
maximization when positive growth in one “zone of privacy” leads
to negative growth in another.
Courts considering further proposals to expand or make explicit
the right to privacy in the Constitution should consider a general
state interest limitation—in addition to the equal protection limit
discussed previously—before giving approval for expansion.
Despite the legitimate value of privacy in maintaining a free society,
Kelley v. Johnson suggests that too much individual privacy can be
detrimental. Widespread recognition of this limitation will further
solidify the definition of privacy in the future so that privacy is not
expanded beyond the point where other privacies are compromised
as a result.

VI. The National Security Limit
Though similar to the state interest limitation presented in
the previous section, the national security limitation deserves consideration given the high level of controversy surrounding the issue.
Of all the limitations presented, this limitation provides the most delicate delineation between appropriate and inappropriate expansions
of the right to privacy. Support for the establishment of a national
security limit can first be found in Olmstead v. U.S. (1928). In the
case Olmstead, the leader of an organization involved in the illegal
sale and distribution of alcohol during Prohibition, complained that
evidence used in his conviction was illegally obtained. More specifically, four probation officers wire-tapped Olsmtead’s telephone and
recorded conversations between Olmstead and his partners that contained descriptions of their illegal business plans. When Olmstead
was arrested and brought to trial, the evidence gathered from the
42
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wire-tapping was used against him. After his conviction, Olmstead
appealed his case on the grounds that his individual right to privacy,
as granted him in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, had been compromised; admitting the illegitimacy of the evidence would consequently exonerate Olmstead.
Initially, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
to invalidate the evidence saying that it did violate the privacy given
to Olmstead in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (which protect
against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as forced testimony
against oneself). The Court argued, “It is of the very nature of the
telephone service that it shall be private…The wire tapper destroys
this privacy. He invades the person of the citizen, and his house,
secretly and without warrant. Having regard to the substance of
things, he would not do this more truly if he secreted himself in the
home of the citizen.”43
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, choosing instead to
limit Olmstead’s right to privacy by allowing the evidence to be used
in court. Regarding the supposed violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court decided that evidence obtained unethically
did not compel an individual to testify against himself in court. Further, regarding the supposed violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court argued that the ability to invalidate evidence unethically obtained did not belong to the Supreme Court (though the
Court did acknowledge the possibility of this outcome in the future,
but only in the form of new legislation from Congress44). Because
there was no existing law prohibiting such evidence from consideration—and because no physical “search and seizure” had been conducted—the Court ruled that it did not have the authority to deny the
evidence from consideration in the trial.
Based only on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Olmstead—especially referencing the Court’s allowance for legislation banning
illegally obtained evidence—it is difficult to identify limitations of
privacy. Thus, further investigation of subsequent court rulings and

43

Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438, 454 (1928).

44

See id. at. 465.

Right to Privacy

19

legislation is necessary. Olmstead, however, is significant because it
presents the first balancing of national security and individual privacy.
Olmstead was partially overturned in Katz v. U.S. (1967). Katz,
convicted of selling gambling information across state lines (a federal offence), claimed that evidence gained from wiretapped phone
conversations was impermissible in Court because the process by
which it was gained violated his right to privacy, inherent in the
Fourth Amendment. Though the circumstances of the case are nearly identical to that of Olmstead, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Katz, claiming that the interpretation of privacy had evolved since
Olmstead.
Although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure
of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on
which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held
that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements, overheard without any “technical trespass under
. . . local property law”.
Here again, we find evidence that the definition of the right to privacy continues to evolve and expand over time. I should be clear that I
do not offer a claim regarding the appropriateness of this expansion;
instead, I offer the claim that constitutional privacy continues to
expand, and that it is possible for privacy to expand beyond the point
that it continues to benefit society. With this in mind, it is important
to mention the Supreme Court’s statement that the actions of the federal agents responsible for the wiretapping would likely have been
justified had they first gained the proper consent from a third-party
judge. Their actions were illegal primarily because the agents did
not first acquire a search warrant. In essence, the Supreme Court
did recognize that wiretapping was appropriate in certain situations,
even when the suspect is unaware of the invasion of their privacy.
The issues of wiretapping, national security, and individual privacy again came to the foreground when the Patriot Act was instituted in 2001. A response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the
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Act significantly reduced legal restraints on federal law enforcement.
Most important in this context was the sanctioning of roving wiretaps (wiretaps not restricted to any single communication device, but
able to transfer to any device used by the suspect in question). While
certain elements of the Patriot Act have been brought into question,
the wiretapping clause was renewed by President Obama as of 2011.45
Until now, there have been no further court cases involving the issue.
There is no question that there should be strict and detailed
restrictions on the appropriate circumstances for wiretapping. However, the principle illustrated in the legal history of wiretapping
again suggests that it is possible for privacy to overstep its appropriate bounds. In the event that privacy were expanded to the point
that wiretapping was totally marginalized, national security would
be reduced by a significant extent. Seen in this light, increasing individual privacy would risk the preservation of privacy because an
individual’s right to be left alone would be legitimately endangered.
Recognizing that threats to national security on a grand scale are
unlikely to be a daily occurrence, it should still be a significant consideration. The decision to establish a national security limit on the
right to privacy in the future should be taken seriously.

VII. Conclusion
It may be intuitive to assume that all individual rights are independent; thus it is possible for everyone to maintain an unlimited
level of one’s own liberty without affecting the liberty of those
around him. This assumption, however, is faulty. While personal
liberty (or privacy) should be maximized, there is a point at which
privacy begins to decrease in its utility to society, and even becomes
destructive. As the constitutional support for the right to privacy
continues to be molded over time, it is especially crucial to limit
the expansion of privacy at its point of maximization so that privacy
does not expand beyond its appropriate “zones.”46 The challenge will
45
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be to distinguish these zones of privacy, where they begin and where
they end.
Analysis of the limits placed on the right to privacy in the past
strongly suggests that the point of maximization for privacy occurs
when privacy begins to compromise other rights explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Given the nature of individual privacy, it is
possible, even likely, that continued expansion of privacy rights for
individuals in specific zones can in other zones decrease the protection of privacy. This point is clear in Washington v. Glucksberg,
where the right of a terminally-ill, mentally competent individual
to commit suicide is limited in order to preserve equal protection
under the law lower-class or disabled citizens. The point is reiterated
in Kelley v. Johnson and Olmstead v. U.S., where an expansion of
privacy comes at the expense of a legitimate state interest or at the
expense of a nation’s ability to protect its citizens, the right to privacy has expanded beyond the point at which it continues to benefit
society.
When taken to the extremes, privacy can be a double-edged
sword. On one edge, privacy can be regulated so heavily that individuals have very little privacy, if any at all. Given that the major focus
of public attention centers on the expansion of privacy, it is necessary to increase awareness regarding the other edge of the sword:
the trend towards absolute privacy also decreases individual rights,
even the right to privacy itself. Privacy is a legitimate right; indeed it
is crucial for a free society. However, the unrestrained expansion of
individual privacy may be just as damaging to individual privacy (as
well as other constitutional rights) as is unrestrained privacy. Thus,
future decisions to expand privacy should not be granted until the
limitations of privacy are fully considered.

A Middle-Ground Treatise on Same-Gender and
Religious Marriage
J. Braden Fraser1

A

s proponents of same-sex marriage grow increasingly vocal
in their appeal for equal rights and social status, they seem
increasingly at odds with the religious communities who
hold that only marriage between a man and a woman should be
legally recognized. In return, these religious groups express concern
about maintaining their religious freedoms. While the interests of
these two groups are both important, many solutions proposed up
to this point only serve the apparently irreconcilable interests of one
group or the other.2
In the course of this review I will highlight some important
aspects of the current debate and suggest a possible resolution. Section 1 will address the current state of the same-sex marriage debate.
Section 2 will focus on the potential economic, religious, and social
ramifications of legalizing same-sex marriage. In light of these
potential ramifications, Section 3 will highlight the system used by
other countries, namely legalizing only those marriages solemnized
by a government authority. In addition, it will propose a solution
which may satisfy both same-sex and traditional marriage advocates based on the models of these other countries. I propose that, to
resolve this issue, states should separate civil marriage ceremonies
from religious marriage ceremonies. This will allow state govern1
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ments to decide who can be joined civilly, which will likely lead to
the legalization of same-sex marriage across the nation. It will also
separate civil and religious marriage, thus protecting religious institutions from the economic and legal consequences that would follow
the legalization of same-sex marriage.

I. Background
A. Is Same-Sex Marriage On the Rise?
Currently seven states and Washington, D.C. have legalized
same-sex marriage.3 Proposition 8, which was added to the California Constitution in 2008, is under national scrutiny for stipulating that heterosexual marriages are the only marriages recognized
in California.4 Proposition 8 was a 2008 ballot initiative in which
the people of California voted to add the phrase, “Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” to
the state constitution.5 Supporters of Proposition 8 were concerned
about maintaining the traditional definition of marriage, and, while
not all of them oppose same-sex couples living together, they maintain that same-sex marriage advocates should not be allowed to force
their views of marriage on those who oppose calling same-sex unions
“marriage.”6 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the lawsuit filed against California in response to Proposition 8, appeared before the U.S. District
Court of Appeals in February of 2012, confirming an earlier decision
by the California Supreme Court that overturned Proposition 8.7 The
Perry case could potentially go before the Supreme Court sometime
in the next year, so California could soon be added to the list of
3
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states in which same-sex marriage is legal. According to available
poll data, the nation is split on whether same-sex marriage should
be legalized, but sixty percent of those questioned in a recent poll
fall in the combined category of believing same-sex marriage should
be legalized or believing same-sex couples should be granted civil
unions.8 It is possible that opinions on this issue, which seemed to
be dominated by those opposed to such unions, may eventually shift
sufficiently to allow same-sex couples equal opportunity to marry or
enter into civil unions.
With this possibility in mind, religious institutions and other
entities opposed to such unions must consider the effect legalizing
same-sex marriage will have on their organizations. These institutions will likely be affected socially, religiously, and economically.
Social issues revolve primarily around the tension between same-sex
marriage advocates and opponents. As this tension is not likely to be
resolved even if same-sex couples are allowed to participate in civil
unions, I will not address the social issue further. Religiously these
institutions face the possibilities of anti-discrimination lawsuits and
of being forced to perform same-sex marriages. The primary economic factor which concerns religious institutions is losing their tax
exempt status on property. These two categories of potential problems will be addressed in subsequent sections of the paper.

B. A State or Federal Issue?
Currently the power to decide the scope of civil marriage belongs
to the states; however, as the interests of traditional marriage and
same-sex marriage advocates become more disparate, the federal
government may be tempted to interfere. I argue that the right to
marry should remain with the states since the purview of marriage
is not specifically granted to the federal government in the Constitution, except in cases regarding the interstate recognition of marriages
and civil unions. Since same-sex marriage legislation does involve
8
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federal laws (First Amendment, The Religious Freedom Reformation Act, Fourteenth Amendment, etc.) which are being interpreted
on a state level, interstate conflicts are likely to arise, highlighting
the need for a neutral third party like the federal government to manage the dispute.
The aforementioned Perry v. Schwarzenegger case and other
cases that have or will likely arise from this divisive issue may influence the rights of religious institutions to practice their beliefs. This
is a Constitutional issue. Thus, while it is important that the power
to create laws regarding marriage remains a state issue, the federal
government may need to step in and decide whether current and
forthcoming state laws are in keeping with the First Amendment.
To further this discussion it is important to highlight Proposition 8
and New York Senate Bill A8354, a 2011 bill that legalized same-sex
marriage in that state.

II. Religious Ramifications
The First Amendment protects one of the most essential liberties: religious freedom. In recent history religious groups have called
upon this constitutional protection in their push to reserve marriage
rights solely between a man and a woman. Some of these religious
groups fear that, if same-sex marriage is legalized, those with the
ecclesiastical authority to perform traditional marriages will be
required to perform same-sex marriages as well.9 However, this fear
is not legally grounded, since government interference in religious
activities violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
the second of two clauses which compose the right to religious freedom. This clause states, “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibit-

9
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ing the free exercise [of religion].”10 A law that prohibits religious
institutions from the free exercise of their religion would violate this
clause. To establish this we will first examine the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to show what the government must prove in order to
require religious institutions to perform these marriages.
According to The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability” unless government can prove “that application of the
burden to the person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”11 The Supreme Court has
not always held the RFRA to be a legitimate test for whether or not
something violates the Free Exercise Clause.12 However, in a 2006
decision the Court used the language of the RFRA to assert that it
was illegal for the State of New York to restrict illegal drug use in
the religious ceremonies of the O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao
Do Vegetal church.13 In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benficiente
Uniao Do Vegetal (O Centro), the Supreme Court held that it is illegal
to unduly burden religious institutions in cases where government
officials cannot establish both that the burden furthers a compelling government interest and that it does so in the least restrictive
way possible.14 Therefore, even if the Supreme Court considers the
RFRA to be unconstitutional, they still hold that the language of the
bill serves as an effective test for compelling government interests.
Prior to the passage of New York Senate Bill A8354 in July of
2011, Republican state senators urged Governor Andrew Cuomo
to include broader protections for religious institutions. The legis10
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lation had originally included exemptions for religious institutions
and private charitable organizations to “provide accommodations,
advantages, facilities or privileges related to the solemnization or
celebration of a marriage.”15 Furthermore, the bill stated that the
refusal of religious groups to perform these ceremonies “would not
result in any state or local government action to penalize, withhold
benefits, or discriminate against such religious corporation . . . .”16
However, stipulations such as these are already granted to religious
entities under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In
light of similar First Amendment issues, the compelling interest doctrine emerged in the Supreme Court in the early 1960s.17 This doctrine requires states to have a convincing reason for enacting laws
that infringe on religious conduct.18 For example, in Employment
Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court ruled against the religious use
of peyote, claiming that the Oregon law against peyote is a “neutral
law of general applicability,” and therefore does not violate the First
Amendment.19 In addition, the Court prohibited “mak[ing] the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land.”20
Although cases such as this have led to an increasingly narrow
interpretation of the compelling interest doctrine, legalizing samesex marriage directly relates to religious marriage, and attempting
to require religious organizations to perform these marriages would
therefore be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. A recently
decided Supreme Court case, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, further reinforces the protections offered to religious organizations as established in the Free Exercise Clause.21 This case involved a woman
who was fired from a private religious university. Claiming discrim15
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ination, this woman appealed to the government,22 and the case was
recently heard by the Supreme Court. Hosanna-Tabor established a
precedent for the ability of the government to interfere in religious
matters.23 It is obvious that the Federal Government will remain reticent to infringe on religious institutions’ right to autonomy in hiring
and firing ministers and other employees in accordance with their
religious beliefs.

III. Economic Ramifications
Legalizing gay marriage also carries a potential economic burden on religious institutions, including potential court costs and losing tax-exempt status. In his review Or For Poorer? How Same-Sex
Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, Roger Severino, legal counsel for the Becket Fund, makes note of the looming vulnerabilities
religious institutions face.24 Although religious exemptions exist to
prevent lawsuits aimed at religious institutions who refuse to perform same-sex marriages, “a separate question, however, is whether
governments must provide equal funding and access to programs to
otherwise ‘discriminatory’ religious organizations.”25 State and federal anti-discrimination laws may serve as rational grounds for the
dissolution of government association and subsequent assistance to
these institutions if they do not comply with marrying same-sex couples. Since these religious and charitable groups would be operating
in contrast to public policy, governments may be inclined to cancel
funding and tax-exemption—critical for many faith-based organizations which rely upon these funds to adequately perform charitable
services—on grounds of discrimination against same-sex couples.26
As stated by the California Supreme Court in 2008, “affording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the designation of
22
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marriage will not impinge upon the religious freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person; no religion will
be required to change its religious policies or practices with regard
to same-sex couples . . . .”27 Furthermore, supreme courts in other
states have also affirmed that the legalization of same-sex marriage
would place no bearing or limits on the religious liberties of those
who oppose it. Fredric J. Bold of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review argues that “there are a host of areas in which conflict
seems likely: violations of anti-discrimination law in public accommodations, employment, housing, education, or charitable services;
loss of tax-exempt status for violating public policy; and violation
of hate-crime laws.”28 Legislation may continue to assure protection
from the compelled performance of these marriages, but religious
organizations remain vulnerable to the other facets of federal and
state law.29 With increased public approval of same-sex marriage,
it is reasonable to believe that “religious actors and institutions do
face the prospect of losing tax-exempt status or other government
privileges as a result of their advocacy against same-sex marriage
or their desire to avoid the appearance of its endorsement by forced
association with the practice.”30
The loss of an organization’s tax-exemption would truly become
a substantial threat due to several stipulations within the Internal
Revenue Code.31 This code is comprised of Federal statutory tax law
that covers domestic tax areas such as income tax and gift taxes. In
accordance with section 170 and section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, tax-exempt organizations must not engage in any
activity contrary to settled “public policy.”32 Shifting political tides
27
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indicate the inevitability of same-sex marriage becoming legalized
throughout the nation, effectively making it public policy. Religious
institutions that refuse to perform these marriages will face conflict
as they operate in defiance of public government policy. This issue is
similar in scope to that of religious adoption agencies like the Catholic Charities. The State of Illinois requires Catholic Charities and
other adoption agencies to consider same-sex couples when deciding where to place foster children.33 If these groups fail to comply,
the State Government is authorized to reduce the amount of state
funding they receive.34 This is particularly a concern for religious
institutions because their extensive tax-exempt holdings could be
at stake if current trends regarding same-sex marriage continue.35
Along with this, religious institutions face the potential withdrawal
of funding from state and federal governments on grounds of discrimination; state and federal anti-discrimination laws would serve
as rational grounds for the dissolution of government association
and subsequent assistance to these institutions.36 Since these religious and charitable groups would be operating contrary to public
policy by not performing same-sex marriages if these unions were
pronounced legal, governments may be inclined to cancel funding
and critical tax exemptions that faith-based organizations rely upon
to adequately perform charitable services.37
This action could have a significant impact on the charitable
arms of these religious institutions and the lives of those whom these
organizations help. The Catholic Church is one such institution that
would be negatively affected by such action. Catholic Charities USA
funds many disaster relief efforts and poverty campaigns across
the nation. According to “Catholic Charities: At A Glance,” a sta33
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tistical analysis produced by Catholic Charities USA in 2009, the
organization “provided help and created hope for 9,164,981 (unduplicated) people regardless of their religious, social or economic
backgrounds.”38 If the tax-exempt status of these organizations were
revoked for their stance against same-sex marriage, it could significantly affect the service-oriented branches of these religious institutions and others like them.

IV. Separating Civil and Religious Marriages
As the movement for same-sex marriage progresses and the
norms of anti-discrimination laws broaden, society must ask how
a pluralistic society can “commit to both equality and tolerance of
religious differences.”39 Past social movements for racial and gender equality led to the creation of civil rights laws and government
authority to enforce them.40 Proponents of marriage equality have
pursued this legislation on similar premises and have subsequently
encountered mixed reactions from a government that constantly
struggles to balance their interests with those of religious groups.41
As Minow argues, “the protection of religious freedom is itself a
civil right, and working out room for both religious freedom and
freedom from discrimination should motivate government officials
and advocates who care about civil rights, restrained government,
and respect across differences.”42
In light of these issues I propose that every marriage be preceded
by a civil union and that the state governments be given exclusive
control over such unions. To explain why my proposal is relevant I
will discuss again Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. As stated previously,
this case involves a woman who was fired from a private religious
38
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university. Claiming discrimination, she appealed to the government. As a friend-of-the-court brief stated, filed in defense of the
religious institution involved, “The reason for the church’s decision is
beside the point. The point is that under our constitutional structure,
who decides the question is determinative, not what is decided or
why.”43 The Supreme Court’s recent decision matches the sentiments
of the friend-of-the-court brief by asserting that while deciding how
to meet the frequently conflicting demands of the Establishment
and Free-Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, “both Religion
Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a
religious group to fire one of its ministers.”44 This supports the claim
that the federal government is continuing to ensure that religious
organizations maintain their autonomy. However, to create additional protections for these institutions regarding their decisions on
who to marry, the powers to solemnize civil and religious marriage
ceremonies should be separated. I will now discuss similar systems
in other countries which may highlight why adopting such a system
is a viable option.

A. Examples Outside the United States
It’s important to examine the satisfaction of both same-sex and
religious groups in the countries that have separated civil and religious marriages so that we can speculate how effectively this policy
will solve our current problems. Germany has allowed registered
partnerships for same-sex couples since 2001.45 Although registered
partnerships give same-sex couples equality in inheritance, alimony,
health insurance, immigration, and name change, they do not grant
same-sex couples tax benefits.46 As a result, the people of Germany
are calling for a change to the current policy. The majority of Ger43
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mans favor marriage equality, and a marriage equality bill has been
introduced to the German legislature to change the policy and allow
marriage for same-sex couples.47
Brazil is another country that requires civil processes for marriage. While a couple can have a religious marriage, they are not
considered legally binding.48 A civil marriage must be performed in
order for the marriage to be recognized by law. In May of 2011, Brazil’s Supreme Court voted unanimously to recognize civil unions.49
Although civil unions give same-sex couples all of the same 112
rights given to straight married couples, same-sex couples in Brazil are fighting for marriage.50 In June 2011, a Brazilian state judge
decided to uphold a same-sex marriage, based upon the Supreme
Court’s May decision, the Brazilian Constitution’s objective of
“promot[ing] the good of everyone,” and provisions in the Constitution that allow the conversion of a civil union to a marriage.51 It is
obvious, then, that Brazil’s homosexual couples want more than just
civil unions, but that they are not trying to force religious institutions to perform marriages for them. While gay couples still want
more rights, the separation of civil and religious marriages seems to
have alleviated the tension between religious and gay groups. Perhaps with similar policies in the United States, conflicts between
religious and gay communities will dissipate.
47
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Laws such as these may quell tensions that arise when religious
beliefs conflict with the laws of the state. In accordance with the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution, the ability of the government to establish a religion by law was denied.52 Furthermore,
cases that followed set precedents for the distinct separation between
church and state affairs. The landmark decision in the 1962 Supreme
Court case of Engel v. Vitale was based on the conclusions that “the
Establishment Clause’s first and immediate purpose rested on the
belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.”53 My solution, modeled after systems found both in Europe and South America, would truly allow
moral and religious-based arguments to “continue to apply with full
force on religious marriage, but no longer carry such great weight in
the argument over who is entitled to civil marriage.”54 While recognizing the limitations in resolving the entire issue at hand, this solution would provide benefits to both sides as the religious sacrament
of marriage would be “preserved in whatever form a particular sect
deems holy” and same-sex partners would be able to be married.55

B. Adopting a Similar System
In an opinion piece in the New York Times in 2009, David Blankenhorn and Jonathan Rouch asserted that to find a common ground
in this issue the Federal Government needs to take action and legalize same-sex civil unions while strongly maintaining the freedoms
of religious institutions to not condone or perform such marriages.56
If states do choose to separate religious and civil unions, the Federal
Government would not need to become involved in this issue. Under
52
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this system, individuals would be required to marry civilly under
state authority and would then be able to participate in religious marriage ceremonies as long as they meet the requirements set by the
particular religious institution through which the desired additional
ceremony would be performed. Thus, religious institutions will be
free to perform religious marriage ceremonies as they see fit. This
would allow them to continue to set reasonable requirements on such
ceremonies, separating such practices from the legal process.
The exclusive right to perform civil marriages should be given
to state governments, rather than federal, in order to limit federal
government regulation and preserve state autonomy in this sensitive
issue. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution states “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”57 Marriage is not a right delegated to the United
States through the Constitution; therefore, it must belong either to
the States or to the people. Currently it is in the jurisdiction of the
States to decide how to regulate marriage and as a result, some states
have already legalized same-sex marriage.
Allowing state governments to exercise exclusive marriage
rights may benefit society. It seems that if state governments remain
responsible for performing marriages, many states will move in the
direction of legalizing same-sex marriage. However, religious institutions would not need to fear being forced to perform ceremonies
for same-sex couples because the government would lack a compelling interest to interfere in those ceremonies. This option would represent a compromise which would allow both sides to have most of
what they want. Supporters of same-sex marriage would have their
marriage, and government would not interfere in the religious ceremonies of institutions opposed to the practice.
One possible contention against allowing the federal and state
governments to have exclusive marriage rights is that this may not
appease same-sex marriage advocates as it is intended to. Should we
believe these advocates would be appeased by the state government
legalizing same-sex marriages? It is reasonable to suppose that this
57

U.S. Const. amend. X.

A Middle-Ground Treatise on Same-Gender and Religious Marriage

37

might not stop them from trying to force religious institutions to perform religious ceremonies for same-sex couples. People who support
this assertion might say that the problem with granting same-sex
couples the right to marry is that the social momentum by which
same-sex marriages became legal would then become active in pursuing laws that would require religions to accommodate same-sex
couples in religious ceremonies. However, I do not believe that such
a situation necessarily follows from granting government the right
to perform marriages.
Another objection may be that taking the right to solemnize civil
marriages from religious institutions would remove a right that religious institutions originated and would present it to those who are
antagonistic to their views. This is not the case. In granting government the exclusive right to perform civil marriages, religious institutions would be placing that right in the power of an institution
entrusted with the protection of their religious rights as well as the
rights of same-sex marriage advocates.

V. Conclusion
I suggest that state governments seriously consider this option
as a means of appeasing some of the demands of those on both sides
of the same-sex marriage debate. Although the government would
never force religious institutions to perform same-sex marriages,
there may be other social and economic ramifications that these institutions should be aware of. Granting government exclusive rights to
perform civil marriages may allow an adequate separation between
church and state which would mitigate these negative ramifications
while serving as a means to appease same-sex marriage advocates.
With this policy, religious institutions would also be free to perform
their own religious marriage ceremonies as they see fit. This would
protect religious institutions and enable a peaceful resolution to the
same-sex marriage debate.

Subpoenaed Media Members and the 1917
Espionage Act
Timothy Allen1

Introduction

I

n a 2012 Rolling Stone interview with Julian Assange, the infamous instigator of Wikileaks, Assange spoke about a situation
involving 24-year-old Army veteran Bradley Manning. Manning, an alleged informant of Wikileaks, has been kept in a military
prison for the last 600 days as he has awaited trial and a possible life
sentence. Assange is reportedly in contact with Manning’s defense,
who stated that they believed Manning’s treatment was an attempt
to get him to testify that Assange is a spy. He went on to talk about
how the government’s plans to prosecute him and to interpret the
Espionage Act in such a way that any media member who tries to
solicit classified information from a government official could be
prosecuted as a spy.2 The government’s future attempts at prosecuting Assange will give insight as to how they wish to handle the
media and transparency in the future.
With recent events, such as Wikileaks, the question of prosecuting private individuals, members of the media, and news organizations for publishing classified information has become a topic of
debate.3 In 1970, the Justice Department adopted guidelines for federal prosecutors that protected news organizations and journalists
1
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under the First Amendment in an attempt to promote greater government transparency. These guidelines state that source subpoenas
should only be ordered when they “strike the proper balance between
the public interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information
and the public interest in effective law enforcement and the fair
administration of justice.”4
However, in direct opposition to these guidelines, the government has recently employed two tactics to limit the media and their
sources. First, they have threatened to use the 1917 Espionage Act,
which was enacted during World War I to protect the nation from
spies, to prosecute the media along with their confidential sources.5
Over the years this act has created controversy; in 2006, Judge Ellis
said that it is “unconstitutionally vague and might violate the First
Amendment.”6 Second, along with this threat of using the Espionage Act against the media, there have been high numbers of media
source related subpoenas, which cause reporters to lose their confidential sources or go to jail for contempt.7
In order to quell these threats on the media and protect the
media’s important role in government transparency, 40 states and the
District of Columbia have adopted forms of a shield law. These laws
protect media members by establishing criteria for media subpoenas,
which strike a balance between the media’s role to foster transparency and the government’s right to protect classified information.
Although some states have shield laws, there are no federal laws that

4
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afford the media such protection.8 Attempts to pass such federal laws
have failed in the years 2005, 2007, and 2009.9 While a federal shield
act would help limit the numerous source subpoenas, the use of the
1917 Espionage Act would continue to hamper the media’s ability to
keep the government responsible for its actions and promote transparency. Therefore, to ensure protection of the media system, the
1917 Espionage Act must be partially amended so that it cannot be
used against media and their sources when published information
benefits the public more than it potentially harms national security.
Both an amendment of certain parts of the Espionage Act and an
adoption of a federal shield law are necessary to ensure protection of
public interest through the role of the media.
Section one of this article will set forth what constitutes public interest and show the important role of the media in protecting
public interest. Section two will then discuss how media subpoenas
and the Espionage Act have been used to violate public interest by
threatening the transparency provided by the media. Finally, section
three will enumerate specific provisions for a federal shield law, to
protect media members and their sources, and changes needed in the
Espionage Act, to ensure protection of public interest.

Section One
While there is no consensus on what specifically constitutes public interest, it is often viewed as what is best for citizens of a country
as a whole.10 Throughout the history of democratically established
countries, especially the United States, it has been the role of the
8
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government to protect public interest. President Theodore Roosevelt
concluded, “The object of the government is the welfare of the
people.”11 The United States Constitution charges the government
with the obligation to protect the public interest of each citizen by
ensuring that each citizen has the right to assemble peaceably, keep
and bear arms, practice religion, and enjoy privacy in all matters
in which the rights of others are not violated.12 While these rights
are explicitly outlined in the Constitution, over the years the United
States government, in an effort to protect the welfare of the people,
has become larger and more involved in the lives of its citizens. With
this growth has come the increasing need for transparency to ensure
that the government does not overstep its authority and, ironically,
infringe upon public interest.
One way transparency in government has been established in the
United States is through the media, which serves as a watchdog over
government actions. In Richmond Newspaper v. Virginia, newspaper reporters solicited a review from the Supreme Court of Virginia
regarding a closure order that denied the reporters the right to have
access to a murder trial.13 These reporters argued that it was their
right to attend the trial as stated in the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court defended
the media’s role as a watchdog over government actions, including
those pertaining to the judicial branch. Justice Stevens, in offering
a concurring opinion, referenced the position he took in another
case regarding the media, Houching v. KQED, where he said that
he was “convinced that...concealing...knowledge from the public by
arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and the press protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” He continued by stating that, in the case of Richmond Newspaper v. Virginia, the Court
“unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to
11
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important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech
and of the press protected by the First Amendment.”14
Along with watching over the actions of the judicial branch by
reporting on the rulings of court cases, the media also protects public interest by reporting on new legislation, politicians’ behavior, and
incidents of corruption within the government. The information provided by the media influences how citizens vote and how they pressure government officials. The media serves as a safeguard against
government actions and provides important information to citizens
in order to promote an effective democratic system.
However, in recent years the government has employed two
main tactics to mitigate the effectiveness of the media’s role in protecting public interest by attacking the media and their sources:
media subpoenas and the Espionage Act of 1917. Media source subpoenas are court orders which force a media member to disclose
their confidential source, who is often a member of a government
organization, or go to jail for contempt. Meanwhile, The Espionage
Act of 1917, enacted by Woodrow Wilson in order to deal with public
concern over national security, is now being used by the government to prosecute media informants under the same laws as spies.
Thus, these subpoenas and this Act cause fear among media sources
and cripple the media system leaving the government unchecked and
public interest undefended.

Section Two
The first method used by the government to impede the media’s
role to protect public interest has been the use of media subpoenas.
Informants often leak classified government material that they feel
is in the public interest to know. Historically, the practice of leaking
information to the media in this way was accepted by many members
of government organizations, and the government did not attempt to
find or prosecute the individuals.15 Recently, however, the govern14
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ment has continuously sought to find and prosecute media informants
through media-source subpoenas. For example, in 2006, Frontline
news submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to
the Justice Department inquiring about the number of media related
subpoenas. They reported that there were “approximately 142 matters” spanning from 1991, the beginning of keeping such records,
until October 2006. From those 142 subpoenas, it was reported
that fewer than 20 were seeking a reporter’s confidential source.
This number, however, is not fully inclusive of all source related
subpoenas. According to the Justice Department’s Director of Public
Affairs, the number of journalists who have received source subpoenas is unknown because the work of special prosecutors is “not run
through the department.” In the FOIA request received by Frontline,
there was not a recording of four of the most prominent cases of
source subpoenas in recent years, including the Valery Plame investigation; furthermore, in just these four cases there were at least 20
reporters subpoenaed for sources.16
The experiences of New York Times reporter James Risen show
how the government is impeding public interest when they subpoena
media members for their sources. James Risen has won the Pulitzer
Prize twice and reported on many of the biggest news breaks of the
last decade.17 He was subpoenaed twice in 2008 and again in 2010
for the United States’ case against Jeffery Sterling.18 Upon having
his subpoena reissued in 2010, Risen wrote an affidavit to the court
in order to explain his lack of compliance. In his affidavit he wrote,
“Reporting on intelligence and national security has often included
major revelations of great public interest.” He goes on to state some
of these revelations: the waterboarding of terrorist suspects, the
CIA’s withholding of intelligence that showed Iraq had no weapons

16
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of mass destruction, and the NSA’s eavesdropping on phone calls
and emails of private U.S. citizens without congressional approval.
Many of the stories published by Risen revealed information
that hurt and embarrassed the Bush administration, but he states that
he has never published information, even if it was newsworthy and
true, if it would cause real harm to national security. This did not
stop the Bush administration from organizing picketing outside Risen’s office, along with hate mail from right wing groups, including
“personal threats.” Public threats of prosecution or contempt continued throughout the case, and Congressman Peter Hoekstra said
that Risen and his associates would “be sitting in jail by the end of the
year until they reveal their sources.”19 No matter the amount of
public support or public interest involved, the government continued
to threaten Risen into the Obama administration.20 The government
did not care that Risen was merely informing the people of an illegal
government action against the public, such as when the U.S. illegally tapped into Americans’ phones. Presidential administrations
and other organizations, such as the CIA, that keep information confidential for reasons other than national security want to stop the
media from reporting those secrets. They cover their mistakes and
misconducts and want to claim national security to silence the media
from revealing information that has public interest in mind.
James Risen is just one example when it comes to media being
threatened and undermined by the government. Judith Miller, a
reporter for the New York Times, was subpoenaed to reveal her source
of information in relation to Valery Plame.21 Plame was an undercover CIA officer who had her identity leaked to various members of the
media by “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff at
the time. Libby was reportedly angered by Plame’s husbands’ criticism
19
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of the Bush administration.22 Both Libby and Miller were convicted,
but Miller alone spent six months in jail.23 Libby was commuted of
his 30 month sentence by President Bush.24 Notably, Miller never
actually published an article outing Plame; that was done by Robert
Novak.25 Miller just had the information and refused to give up her
source when in court. In fact there were many reporters subpoenaed in this case, which goes against the common practice of only
subpoenaing media members for their sources if there is no other
way to get the same information.26 Miller’s situation further shows
the disregard for media and in turn public interest. The administration leaks information to hurt political opponents and protect their
own politicians, while subpoenaing public interest minded media
members. Public interest cannot be protected if the government is
manipulating the media in these ways.
The second way the government has been attacking the media
and their sources is the current and threatened potential use of the
1917 Espionage Act. Established far prior to the contemporary practice of media subpoenas, Woodrow Wilson enacted the 1917 Espionage Act in order to deal with public concern over national security
during World War I. The United States had never before engaged
in such an international altercation, so the nature and provisions of
the 1917 Espionage Act naturally followed a more radical nature.
Some provisions simply expounded on the Sedition Act of 1798, but
22
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others represented a drastic departure from previous legislation.27
The minority opposition deemed these controversial provisions an
infringement on individual freedoms and liberties.
One of the first uses of the 1917 Espionage Act came in 1919
when Charles Schenck was prosecuted for passing out fliers that
compared conscription in the army to slavery.28 In Schenck v. United
States, it was decided that the act was not a violation of free speech;
the ruling judge stated that freedom of speech is not protected when
it is encouraging insubordination. This set the standard “clear and
present danger” test concerning what was protected by the First
Amendment and eligible for prosecution under the Espionage Act.
The “clear and present danger” doctrine set forth the famous example of yelling “fire” in a crowded theater, showing that originally
the Espionage Act could be used for prosecuting people who made
a “clear and present danger” to the public. Other than the clear
obstruction of peaceful protest, this case shows that the Espionage
Act’s range of use was originally very broad, and while it is no longer used for such cases, its original wording creates an unreasonably
wide range for it to be interpreted. The “clear and present danger”
doctrine was slowly weakened by several rulings ending with Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), in which the current precedent was set at any
speech that would incite “imminent lawless action.”29
The next major case the law was used in was in the 1970’s, when
the government attempted to stop the publication of the “Pentagon
Papers.”30 In The New York Times Co. v. US, the government tried
to stop the publication of documents that detailed classified aspects
of the Vietnam War. The judge ruled that the government could
not continue its injunction but never officially ruled whether or not
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the Espionage Act could be used against a publication.31 Possibly
because the papers were already leaked, the newspapers were not
charged further under the Espionage Act, but the two men who copied and handed out the papers were punished. Anthony Russo and
Daniel Ellsburg believed that what the United States had done in
Asia was wrong and wanted the public to know exactly what happened. While the contents of the documents did show that the Johnson Administration had lied, they were classified as top secret, and
whoever knowingly gave them out qualified for prosecution under
the Espionage Act.
The case was eventually dismissed by the judge when Ellsburg’s
psychiatrist’s office was burglarized and the FBI lost tapes that may
have been used to illegally record phone conversations. The judge
of the case was also reportedly offered the position of FBI Director
during the trial.32 The details of the Russo and Ellsburg case show
that the Espionage Act can be used to prosecute people who are trying to inform the public of the truth, not cause significant damage
to national defense. The case was more of a means to cover embarrassment and discredit the men who leaked the information. The fact
that the judge threw out the case when he realized how much government corruption was involved highlights the need for informants to
be able to leak documents that are defined as classified. These men
clearly had public interest in mind when they leaked the information,
but there was nothing in the law which allowed them to fulfill their
duty to public interest.
The 1917 Espionage Act gives several relatively vague guidelines as to what type of information should not be published. One
part of the law states that anything “concerning the communication
intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government”
is classified information.33 Judge Young said in his memorandum of
31

Jamie L. Hester, The Espionage Act and WikiLeaks, 12 N.C. J.L. & Tech.
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Douglass Martin, Anthony J. Russo, 71, Pentagon Papers Figure, Dies,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/us/
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US v. Morison that the jury can decide what is or is not a matter
of national defense, but the Espionage Act merely states that the
government needs to prove willfulness in knowingly transmitting
information to prosecute an individual for leaking confidential information. He goes on to say that the jury only needs to determine two
things to decide whether something is a matter of national defense:
first, that the information could be potentially damaging to the US
or could be useful to an enemy of the US, and second, that the information was something that the US was trying to keep secret.34 This
shows a key problem with the potential of prosecutions under this
law, because while information could be potentially damaging and
had been keep secret by the government, there is nothing that allows
for a beneficial function of releasing the information to supersede the
potential damage to the nation.
In the last thirty years, courts have continued to convict media
members unjustly under the Espionage Act. In 1985, a United States
intelligence analyst for the Navy was charged and imprisoned for
two years for publishing three photographs in a British defense magazine. The photos were of a Soviet nuclear powered aircraft carrier.
This analyst, Samuel Morison, said that he published them so the
United States and Britain could see what they were up against and
increase funding for their own defense programs.35 Much later, in
2001, he received a presidential pardon from Bill Clinton. In this
case, a publisher of information was technically prosecuted under
the Espionage Act, and Morison was still prosecuted even though all
parties admitted that the photos did not harm national defense.
This flaw in the Act was also shown more recently when Stephen
Jin-Woo Kim, a senior analyst for the Office of National Security,
was convicted under the Espionage Act in 2010 for telling a reporter

34
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that North Korea would be testing a nuclear bomb in the near future.36
The threat of using the Espionage Act against publications and the
practice of convicting minor offenses with no damages to national
security show a pattern of executive branch attempts at causing fear
among potential whistle blowers. Public interest is protected by the
media, and the media is losing its ability to keep confidential sources
and publish news about government due to the use of media subpoenas and the 1917 Espionage Act.

Section Three
This media threat is not stagnant but is actually being supported
in a way to make the Espionage Act even stronger and hurt the role
of the media even more. In contrast to the obvious need to protect
media and public interest, last year legislators pushed a bill called
The Shield Act (s4004). However, far from the shield acts passed in
most states that protect media sources, this act, the Securing Human
Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act, proposed to
widen the already broad prosecution powers of the 1917 Espionage
Act. For example, it defined a transnational threat as any group or
individual that threatens national security. Then, it made publishing information that could have been deemed beneficial to any of
these transnational threats a crime punishable under the Espionage
Act.37 Even though this bill did not pass, it is disturbing to think that
some members of the government promoted something that would
have hurt free press even more. It shows a concerted effort in the
last year to stop any potentially sensitive or embarrassing information from leaving government oversight. With the public interest
afforded from media already under attack, the government is still
seeking to frighten journalists and informants alike. There needs
to be legislation that will strengthen and protect the media’s ability
36
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to communicate with confidential sources and in turn protect public
interest. The following will prescribe a federal shield act as well as a
public interest clause added to the Espionage Act.
The Free Flow of Information Act has been introduced as a federal shield act on four occasions. Currently, the bill has been referred
to the Subcommittee on the Constitution.38 In its previous introduction, the bill died on the Senate floor even though it seemed like there
was a good amount of support for it.39 The only public arguments
made against the bill claim that it negatively affects criminal investigations, but, compared to state shield laws, the proposed federal version contains strong provisions to prevent the law from interfering
with criminal investigations.40 For example, the proposed act specifically details that anyone involved in a criminal investigation who is a
sole witness does not qualify for the act’s protection. This proposed
bill would allow judges to see “that the public interest in compelling
disclosure of the information or document involved outweighs the
public interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.”41
Media source subpoenas would still happen, and people could still
be compelled to testify in a criminal case; however, this would be
done only when necessary to national security and would not jeopardize public interest.
While this bill does have many positives, media is not defined
explicitly in the current form of the bill.42 There have been conflicts

38
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in state cases about who should qualify to use the protection.43 The
bill’s sponsor, Representative Mike Pence, stated, “The Free Flow of
Information Act is not about protecting reporters; it is about protecting the public right to know.”44 Since the bill is not meant to give
special rights to media members, it should protect anyone who is
providing the role of media.
This type of federal shield law still has some details to iron out;
however, the repeated rejection of such bills is due in larger part to
widespread antagonism, apathy, and ignorance. Public support of the
bill must rise, and pressure must be placed on members of Congress
and the President for the bill to pass. The public’s role is especially imperative due to many high ranking government officials who
would not like to provide the public with transparency by letting the
media operate freely.45 Experience can guide future amendments to
the law, but it needs to be in place so that public interest will be protected as soon as possible.
Along with the federal shield law, an amendment must be added
to the 1917 Espionage Act to fully protect the role of the media and
thus, public interest. While a federal shield act would protect media
members from losing their sources and going to jail, their sources
could still face prosecution under the Espionage Act. This amendment would be a public interest clause, allowing public interest to
be weighed much like is done in the Free Flow of Information bill.
This clause would allow a judge to decide if the leaked information
significantly hurt national security or was done with malice. If the
information was leaked with intent to inform the public of something
important, such as an illegal operation by the government, and if the
benefit to public interest outweighed potential damage to national
security, then the individual would not be guilty of espionage. Much
43
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like the shield act, the details of this amendment would have to be
fine-tuned over time, but it is imperative to first implement the law.
These two laws, when implemented together, would help protect
the media’s vital role in government. They would not be passed to
protect the media, but to protect public interest. In US v. Steelhammer, Judge Bryan of the 4th Circuit Court overturned a judgment
of contempt for two reporters that had refused to testify. He wrote
that his “decision now is but the product of a balancing of two vital
considerations: protection of the public by exacting the truth versus
protection of the public through maintenance of free press... Weighing in the scales in favor of this solution is its avoidance of unnecessary incurrence of any potential danger of sterilizing the sources of
newsworthy items.”46 This process, written into law via a federal
shield law and amendment to the Espionage Act, would protect public interest from the strong hand of government. It would promote
transparency, honesty, trust, and public education while attacking
corruption, ineffective government, and crime. That is why these
two laws which protect the public must be passed. A federal shield
law in congruence with the amended Espionage Act will protect
well-intentioned journalists and allow the media to fulfill its role as
an important check and balance to America’s government.
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Freedom to Achieve: The Future of Student-led
Organizations within the Public School System
Braden Johnson1

A

s former Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter wisely
stated, “if facts are changing, law cannot be static.”2 This
maxim keenly describes the Equal Access Act of 1984, a
28-year-old law that was designed to protect the free speech rights
of Christian clubs within the public school system but has become
increasingly ambiguous as the facts surrounding it continue to
change.3 These changes, instituted in 1991 by the formation of the
first public school Gay-Straight Alliance (GSA) club in Newton Centre, Massachusetts, have resulted in increasing confusion about how
schools should handle the emergence of controversial clubs.4 In the
midst of this confusion, the GSA and similar clubs continue to grow
rapidly; since their small beginning in 1991, 30% of Massachusetts
schools now have GSA clubs and over 1,000 GSA’s have formed
nationwide within the last 10 years.5 On the coattails of this emerging student group, other controversial clubs have sought formation
1

Braden Johnson will graduate from Brigham Young University in April,
2012 with a degree in Political Science. He will enroll in law school in
the fall of 2012, and plans to practice law. He wishes to thank Professor
Byron Daynes for his mentorship throughout the creation of this article.

2

Felix Frankfurter, et al, Law and Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix
Frankfurter, 1913-1938 (Harcourt Brace and Company 1939)

3

Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §4071-4074 (1984).

4

See Ann Banks, Teaching Tolerance: Meet the Teacher Who Started GayStraight Alliances, Edutopia (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.edutopia.org/
teaching-tolerance-gay-straight-alliance.

5

See Am. Civil Liberties Union & Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education
Network, Q&A About Gay-Straight Alliances, GSA Network (2001),
http://www.gsanetwork.org/files/resources/GSA.QA_.ACLU_.pdf; See
Gay/Straight Alliances, Massachusetts Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., http://www.doe.mass.edu/cnp/gsa/resGSA.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012); Educ. Bug.
55

56

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 26, 2012

under the same auspices.6 These clubs include groups based on racial
discrimination, reproductive issues, and anarchic political views,
among others.7
As such clubs emerge, school administrators face the difficult
task of interpreting the antiquated Equal Access Act (EAA), despite
the Act’s failure to treat these contemporary issues. A revision of the
Equal Access Act of 1984 is necessary to provide realistic legal standards for dealing with the emergence of controversial and divisive
clubs while protecting the free speech rights of students. I address
the legal issues surrounding the EAA by (A) outlining the background of the act, (B) identifying its weaknesses, and (C) positing
prescriptive solutions, after which I will offer a brief conclusion.

A. Background
The courts first addressed the issues relating to controversial
clubs in Windmar v. Vincent, which eventually led to Congress’
Equal Access Act. Windmar v. Vincent involved the University of
Missouri at Kansas City’s refusal to allow a student religious group
to use its facilities for club functions, citing a conflict with the
Establishment Clause. The students sued, citing a violation of their
First Amendment rights, and eventually prevailed. The Court, in an
8-1 decision, ruled that student-led religious clubs were entitled to
protections under the Free Exercise Clause outweighing any potential Establishment Clause concerns.8 In an effort to canonize the
Court’s ruling, the 98th U.S. Congress enacted the Equal Access Act
in 1984, which prevented schools from discriminating against student-led organizations based on the content of the club’s curriculum.9
6
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The EAA focuses on clubs unrelated to the core curriculum of
the school. It holds that any school allowing at least one non-curriculum related club to form is thereby prohibited from preventing
the formation of any additional non-curriculum related club based
on content. Schools are either to prohibit all non-curriculum related
clubs or to allow all such clubs; they are not permitted to pick and
choose which clubs they will accept or reject. Schools with at least
one non-curriculum related club are labeled as limited-open forums
for discussion. Schools that choose to ban all non-curriculum related
extracurricular activity are termed closed forums.
This new legislation was first tested in 1990, when the Supreme
Court heard Westside Schools v. Mergens.10 The Court again ruled
that a religious club should be entitled to the same rights as any
other club. Because Westside Schools already supported such noncurriculum related organizations as a scuba club and a chess club,
the Court said the school could not prohibit the formation of any
other non-curriculum related club, religious or otherwise. The Court
highlighted Westside School’s scuba and chess clubs as evidence
that the school created a “limited open forum” for student expression.11 Because Westside School allowed for a “limited open forum,”
they could no longer prevent any subsequent non-curriculum related
clubs from forming. If Westside had disallowed all clubs that do not
relate directly to the school curriculum, they would have retained
the right to stop any non-curriculum related student group from
forming, regardless of its content.12 The Court’s decision left schools
with a difficult choice: disallow all non-curriculum related clubs and
retain the freedom to stop controversial clubs from forming (creating a so-called closed forum), or allow at least one club not directly
related to the curriculum, and thereby become bound to allow any

10
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non-curriculum related club to form (creating a so-called “limited
open forum”).

B. Weaknesses of the EAA
Since the Mergens case, the Act has been a magnet for controversy and is vulnerable to criticism on several grounds. (1) The vague
language that comprises the EAA invites conflict among schools,
students, and parents who may have different interpretations of their
rights. (2) Controversial and divisive clubs, citing the protections
offered by the Equal Access Act, have sought acceptance in public
school systems, creating additional conflict. (3) Because the EAA
contains no means for enforcement, the previously stated sources of
conflict often lead to expensive and time-consuming litigation for
injunctive relief and, in some cases, punitive damages. (4) In light
of the threat of expensive litigation, administrators are shown strong
incentive to seek the protection offered by the EAA to schools which
disallow all non-curriculum related clubs.13 This ironically results in
blanket suppression of the same free speech the Act was created
to protect.

Nonspecific Language in the Act
The Equal Access Act relies on a nuanced taxonomy of words to
classify individual cases, yet it is surprisingly nonspecific in defining these concepts.14 For example, the Act offers no guidelines or
definitions with which to classify a club as curriculum related or
non-curriculum related. This presents problems as the Act continues
because the critical distinction of how to classify a “limited open
forum” is defined in terms of an undefined curriculum related distinction. Thus, schools unfamiliar with the extensive jurisprudence
surrounding this issue find it difficult to know whether or not they
have created a limited open forum. Such organizations as the library
13
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club, key club, and even the student council blur the already hazy
line between curriculum related and non-curriculum related student
groups. As Justice John Paul Stevens said regarding the vagueness
of the act, “every high school football program [is now a] borderline case.”15 Consequentially, schools may realistically believe they
have created a “closed forum” by disallowing all clubs they believe
to be “non-curriculum related.” Yet, if the courts disagree with the
school’s interpretation of what clubs are related to the curriculum,
the school is open to legal liability.
The nonspecific wording also saddles schools with vaguely
defined powers to control or discipline clubs. The EAA states that
schools have the authority to “maintain order and discipline . . . to
protect the well being of students and faculty . . . .” and to ensure that
club meetings “[do] not materially and substantially interfere with
the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school.”16
Under this indistinct standard, schools do not have the ability to
stop dangerous clubs from forming, only to discipline them if
they misbehave. Therefore, schools are forced to allow the formation
of clubs such as Students Against Faggots Everywhere (S.A.F.E.).
This example demonstrates the difficult situation faced by schools
under the current nonspecific rendition of the EAA.

Emergence of Controversial and Divisive Clubs
In its broadest sense, the EAA provides that every club within
a public school should have the same set of rules and opportunities,
irrespective of the individual platform or message of the club. Yet
the Supreme Court has supported censorship in the public school
“in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”17
In Bethel v. Fraser, the Supreme Court sent a strong message that
the rights of students in public schools are not the same as the rights
of adults in other settings, by upholding the suspension of a student
15

Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
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for “indecent speech and lewd conduct in [a] school assembly.”18 The
Court also allowed censorship of a school newspaper in Hazelwood
v. Kuhlmeier, stating “a school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its basic educational mission.”19
However, the issue of extracurricular education invites some
gray area. The most controversial clubs are generally unrelated to the
curriculum of the school and take place outside of instructional time.
This is an entirely different circumstance than a disruption during a
compulsory class or assembly, and school boards should be careful
not to over assert their censorship power. However, the school is the
body granting legitimacy to the club and therefore school boards
should have more oversight than if the students were meeting off
campus, in a park or a friend’s basement.
These controversial clubs have provoked parental concern
across the nation, which creates distraction and conflict within the
public school system. Although the views of parents should not be
an authoritative factor in school board decisions, these frustrated
parents often push lawsuits and organize campaigns, both for and
against controversial clubs. Attention is needed to mitigate this
parental uproar on both sides of controversial issues.

Incentive Toward Litigation
The Act falls short in another key category: it contains no independent means for enforcement. Because Part A states that the Act
applies to all schools who receive federal funding, some are under
the impression that this funding will be withheld from schools found
to violate the Act. In fact, Part E specifies no federal funds will be
withheld from any school with relation to this Act.20
This lack of enforcement shifts the burden to our judicial system.
When a student thinks their school is in violation of the Act, they
have very few options before bringing a lawsuit against their school;
there is no federal provision for mediation, no appeal process, and no
18
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outside means of addressing the disagreement. In an effort to bolster
students’ rights, organizations such as Lambda Legal and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) frequently offer free and reduced
cost legal services to students fighting these battles making litigation
all the more likely. Such litigation can be very expensive for the state,
creating long delays in the correct enforcement of the law.
The case of East High School GSA v. Board of Education provides a textbook example of the penalties schools can face for being
on the wrong side of an Equal Access Act conflict.21 In this case, the
Court ordered the Board of Education of the Salt Lake City School
District to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees in addition to paying for their
own legal defense despite East High having successfully brought
itself into compliance with the Act during the process of the trial.
Additionally, in Sharon Gernetzke v. Kenosha School District, the
plaintiffs sought damages against the school in addition to injunctive relief.22 These types of financial penalties could negatively affect
the quality of education within the entire district and demonstrate
another example of why a revision to the EAA is necessary.

Incentive toward Blanket Suppression of Expressive Speech
The cost and distraction associated with circuit, appellate, and
Supreme Court conflict serve as strong motivations for schools to
err on the side of caution with respect to the Equal Access Act. This
influence can provide incentives for schools to act with interests
other than what is best for their students by encouraging administrators to disallow all non-curriculum related clubs entirely.
Schools wanting the assurance of avoiding such conflict must
select from two options. They can choose to cancel their receipt of
Federal Aid to rid them of the jurisdiction of the EAA, or stop
all non-curriculum related clubs.23 Waiving public funds would
leave schools in a difficult financial predicament and would not
be a practical solution. Stopping all clubs would create a de facto
21
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Dist. No. 2:98-CV-193J, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20254, (Nov. 30, 1999).

22

Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 535 U.S. 1017 (2002).

23

Woods, supra note 12 at 385.

62

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 26, 2012

(albeit equal) ban on expressive student speech, which would provide
legal protection for the school. The Act holds that schools must treat
all non-curriculum related clubs equally, and equally prohibiting all
non-curriculum related clubs is considered equal treatment. Schools
that pursue this choice would find themselves without such organizations as the National Honor Society, the Key Club, and Future Business Leaders of America.
Stopping the non-curriculum related clubs has the ironic effect
of suppressing the expression which the EAA was designed to protect. This scenario curtails the Act and negates the benefits it was
created to provide. While stopping all non-curriculum related clubs
should be an option for school boards to consider, the current structures create an atmosphere where this choice will be utilized more
and more by schools unless the effects of the Act are negated. Justice
John Paul Stevens shared this sentiment and lamented that schools
preventing the formation of student-versions of “the Ku Klux Klan”
or “gay rights advocacy groups,” will be forced to close down groups
that are “[no] more controversial than a grilled cheese sandwich.”24

C. Prescriptive Ideas
Revisions to the Act can provide clear guidelines to school
administrators while insulating schools against frivolous lawsuits
and ensuring that students receive prompt responses to complaints.
These revisions should include: (1) Provisions which mandate alternate dispute resolution (ADR) in certain cases to promote fair and
efficient dispute resolution; (2) required parental consent for any
student under the age of 18 to join any extracurricular organization
within the school; (3) increased specificity in language; and (4) a
definitive list of clubs that are detrimental to the educational surroundings of a school.

24
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Mandatory Provisions for Alternate Dispute Resolution
First, a new rendering of the Act should include a provision for
arbitration and other alternate dispute resolution (ADR) techniques
in the event of a conflict. While the current system offers only civil
litigation, a revised Act could include mediation procedures in an
effort to avoid trial or mandatory arbitration provisions. Such techniques can save time and money for both parties.
ADR has already been successfully implemented by Congress
in other federal arenas. In the 2004 revision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, schools are instructed to create individual education plans for students with disabilities. In the event parents are not satisfied with the efforts of their school, they are legally
bound to seek resolution through ADR before suing the school in
open court. This provision has secured significant savings of time
and money, while promoting fair dispute resolution.25
Mandatory mediation for EAA conflict would require that students and school administrators have the opportunity for face-toface dialogue before further action is pursued. Both parties would
meet in the presence of an impartial third party and attempt to reach
an agreeable decision. There would not be much room for bargaining
because the school’s position would be dictated by federal law, yet
students would be given an opportunity to state the merits of their
clubs, make assurances that they would operate within the scope
allowed by law, and answer any questions or concerns put forth by
the school officials. This could also serve as a formal venue for each
party to be apprised of their rights and instructed about further pursuance of grievances.
If mediation does not resolve the conflict, arbitration procedures
should follow. Arbitration will allow both sides to present their case
before an impartial group of arbitrators with experience in state and
federal education law and Supreme Court precedent. The ruling of
the arbitrators is a legally binding decision, and the Act should specify that this ruling is only reviewable by the United States Supreme
Court. Arbitration services can be secured through the American
Arbitration Association, the National Academy of Arbitrators, the
25

104 Stat. 1142.

64

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 26, 2012

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, or a new arbitration
branch created under the Department of Education. Schools found
to be in violation of the EAA will forfeit one-half the salary of the
school board and school administrators until they are ruled in compliance. This will provide enforcement power to the arbitrators and
promote swift compliance with rulings.
ADR is a better solution than civil litigation because it saves
state resources and promotes an efficient timetable for resolution.
Under the current system, large numbers of students who brought
grievances against their school had graduated before the conflict was
resolved. ADR also promotes the government’s interest in protecting
the education and free speech rights of the rising generation.

Mandatory Parental Consent
The state of Utah’s policy of requiring parental consent to join
extracurricular clubs should be included in a new version of the
Act.26 This will solve many of the issues raised by divisive clubs and
will provide an alternative to the blanket ban of clubs that can be
imposed by school officials.27 Parents or guardians who feel strong
opposition to particular clubs, be they Christian themed, GSA, or
any other, will feel confident in their ability to limit the exposure
of their minor child to clubs they deem detrimental.28 Additionally,
parents will have the opportunity to be better informed of their children’s participation in school and can use this information to help
their students.
Parental consent will provide a gatekeeper effect, ensuring that
only clubs which can garner support of parent and student will be
allowed to form. A student may believe it would be fun to create
a cannabis club or a tagging club, but it is likely their parents will
think otherwise and will refuse to provide their consent for their
student to get involved in such an organization. Parental consent can
filter some conflicts before they reach the school level.
26
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Additional Specificity in Language
A revision of the Act would be incomplete without providing
additional specificity in defining main concepts. Of special importance is the concept of noncurricular clubs, a concept undefined by
Congress in this Act.29
In the Mergens case, the Supreme Court acknowledged a loophole in the Act which could allow a school to structure their definition of noncurricular in such a way that would enable the school to
strategically label student groups to avoid conflict with the Act.30
Thus, by labeling every student club of which they approved as curriculum related they would not be forced to allow the creation of
other student-led groups. In considering the ambiguity invited by
the current wording of the Act, the Court placed prohibitions on such
behavior.31 This clarification in the jurisprudence provides the legal
ability to close some loopholes, but creating specific language within
the Act would greatly simplify the burden on schools as they attempt
to follow the laws.
A canonized definition of “curriculum related” should highlight the need for such organizations to be (1) expressly created or
approved by the school (2) for the primary purpose of re-enforcing
the content of at least one school class or institution, (3) open to all
students, and (4) non-compulsory.

Explicit Prohibition of Dangerous or Detrimental Clubs
Finally, despite the sensitive nature of censorship in public
schools, a revision of the Act should provide general guidelines
about what clubs are acceptable for membership by minors. The language of the Act should provide against the formation of any club

29

Id. at 91.

30

Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239
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31

Id. at 92.
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that encourages violence, criminal activities, drug use, discrimination, or that contains explicit content related to human sexuality.32
In congruence with the current version of the EAA, school
administrators have the right to attend any meeting they desire with
the exception of religious meetings. No administrator will be compelled to attend a club meeting if the content is contrary to their
personal beliefs, and no nonschool person will be able to regularly
attend any club meeting.33
The Act should allow the school the power to regulate the actions
of clubs, so long as their regulations are consistent and impartial.
This will strengthen the school’s ability to protect students and preserve a peaceful atmosphere.
It should be noted that, as the court stated in Healy v. James,
schools cannot “restrict speech or association simply because it finds
the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent.”34 The sole purpose for the explicit prohibition of dangerous clubs is to promote the
safety of students and faculty members. This is a compelling state
interest and is critical to the success of the public school system.

D. Conclusion
Much has been written about the controversy and legal battles
surrounding the Equal Access Act of 1984, yet few have proposed
any real solutions to correct the current and future problems invited
by this piece of legislation. By integrating ADR techniques, requiring parental consent, increasing the specificity of language, and
explicitly prohibiting dangerous clubs, Congress can stop short sided
incentives and protect schools from harmful lawsuits while safely
guarding students’ rights to free speech and expression. Realistic
32

Banning sex based clubs will only take effect on clubs that are organized
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and uniform legal standards, coupled with effective enforcement,
can protect the reputation of the public school system and ensure
students are kept safe from physical and mental dangers. This can
also appease worried parents and encourage an open family dialogue
that will benefit students and parents. As controversial student clubs
continue their advancement into schools, clear guidelines are the
only way to ensure that administrators and students retain their constitutional liberties without infringing upon the liberties of others.

How Chinese is the South China Sea?
Steve Tensmeyer1

T

he past summer has seen a flare-up in the longstanding feud
between China and the ASEAN nations over the South China
Sea. Since that time, China has used more strident language
in staking its claims, has authorized increased naval drills in the
area, and has warned several countries, including the U.S., not to
“interfere” with what it considers its central security interests.2 The
most remarkable aspect of this most recent phase of the debate, however, is not China’s aggressiveness, but rather its desire to couch its
claims in terms of universal norms. This has made China’s behavior
somewhat more predictable than it has been in previous decades, but
this predictability does not necessarily make China less of a threat
to its neighbors; in fact, it may only give a cooperative veneer to a
fundamentally aggressive foreign policy.
This increased aggressiveness certainly presents a problem for
other countries with claims in the area, but China’s increased commitment to international norms also suggests a way to resolve these
disputes. China has certainly not been shy about what it considers
its sovereign rights, and the cooperation of other states may have
done more harm than good by convincing China that it can act with
impunity. With China becoming a greater threat by the day, the best
choice for the other nations with claims in the South China Sea (all of
which are members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) may be to seek some legitimation of their claims from an
international body. In this paper, I will investigate one way in which
1
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ASEAN may be able to obtain an international ruling on at least
part of its claims by proposing to the International Seabed Authority
(ISA) a contract for exploration of seabed features and polymetallic
nodules in the open ocean. Since this kind of mining is legally permitted only beyond all international boundaries, when considering
ASEAN’s petition, the ISA may be compelled to determine whether
the area targeted for exploration belongs to China.
China would of course interpret this move as aggressive, and
the political, economic, and perhaps even military blowback would
be significant. A final decision on whether to pursue this line would
have to include a careful evaluation of the possible consequences
in each of these areas. However, in this paper I intend to address
only the legal consequences of such a decision—it may be that, even
if this option would result in a legal victory for ASEAN, political
or economic calculations would make it inadvisable. This essay is
therefore limited in its scope and its conclusions should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.

I. Disputed Areas
The dispute over the South China Sea involves more than just
China’s disagreements with other Southeast Asian countries. There
are many disputes in the region that do not directly involve China.
The Philippines and Vietnam, for example, have had long-standing
disagreements and in 1995 issued a joint statement outlining principles for bilateral relations.3 However, the ASEAN-China dispute
is by far the most important because China claims the entire South
China Sea, contradicting every other country’s claim, and because
ASEAN member states are generally willing to cooperate to
counter China.
One of the major disagreements in the South China Sea area is
over the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by both China and Vietnam. After Vietnam was divided in 1954, the Paracels were administered by South Vietnam. In 1974, when the Vietnamese Civil War
3
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was at its height, China invaded and took over the Paracels. At the
time, because it was China’s ally and because it was involved in a
war with the United States and South Vietnam, North Vietnam did
not strongly object to China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands.4
However, after Vietnam had stabilized, and particularly after relations between the two countries deteriorated to the point of war in
1979, Vietnam began to call for the return of the Paracels and the
renegotiation of maritime borders that had been established by treaties with France before Vietnam won its independence. China has
consistently refused to consider returning the Paracels to Vietnam
(or giving them to the ROC, which also claims them), and as recently
as July of 2010, Communist Party officials asserted that “China will
never waive its right to protect its core interest [including the Paracels] with military means.”5 China has backed up these statements
with the construction of new military infrastructure in the archipelago, including a new airstrip on Woody Island, one of the larger
islands in the group.6
Another disputed chain of islands, the Spratly Islands, has been
claimed by China since the end of World War II, when the ROC
government took control from the defeated Japanese and established
a small military outpost on the largest island. After relocating to Taiwan, the ROC has maintained control of the largest island to this day,
though it does not control the entire archipelago. The Spratly Islands
consist of mostly small, rocky, and uninhabitable outcrops controlled
by small military contingents from China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. The Spratly and Paracel groups are the most
hotly contested islands, but there are other, smaller islands, reefs,
and atolls whose statuses are still unsettled. The Pratas Islands, for
example, are claimed by the PRC and the ROC, and both the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal are claimed by the PRC,
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the ROC, and the Philippines.7 There are also maritime disputes that
do not deal with islands, but most of these stem from varying interpretations of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which will
be dealt with in detail in the next section.
Military clashes over the islands are currently uncommon and
unlikely, though not unprecedented (China’s 1974 invasion of the
Paracels, for example, demonstrates its willingness to back up its
rhetoric with action). However, displays of military strength, almost
exclusively by China, have become commonplace. Among the most
recent was Jiaolong 2010, a round of naval exercises featuring 1,800
soldiers and over 100 ships firing live ammunition.8 Beyond these
displays of power, China has also found other ways to assert its
rights to the area and to showcase its technical superiority; in 2010,
for example, the Chinese Navy used a manned submarine to plant a
PRC flag at the bottom of the South China Sea.9 While there is no
legal significance to such an act, it is symbolically very important.

II. Framework for a Settlement
Several documents have laid the groundwork for future progress
in resolving the South China Sea dispute, and each will need to be
taken into account in any eventual settlement. The most important
of these are the UN Charter, joint statements between the PRC and
other countries regarding the area, the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN,
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. I will consider each
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of these in turn and determine both the process and terms of settlement to which they obligate signatory nations.
The UN Charter forms the foundation of modern international
relations, and there are several provisions that relate to the South
China Sea dispute. The most obvious is Chapter I, Article 2, which
states that “all members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity . . . of any state.”10 Of course, such a provision puts limits on China’s actions. It cannot simply stage a military takeover of the South China Sea without significant blows to
its legitimacy and status in the world. Because of China’s desire to
be seen as a responsible player on the world stage, it is unlikely to
take any action that is not amenable to the rhetoric of international
justice and security. But the requirement to protect peace, security,
and justice gives significant latitude. Most countries have interpreted
this provision quite liberally, and China is no exception. In fact, as
we have seen, China explicitly maintains its right to defend its core
interests with force.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (which will be considered in detail in the next section) and the UN Charter are both
legally binding treaties, and China and the ASEAN nations must
be careful to follow at least a plausible interpretation of them. The
next documents I will consider, the bilateral PRC-Philippines Joint
Statement of 1995 and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, do not carry such explicit legal weight. Because both of these
documents (and others that I will not consider here) contain similar
statements, I will analyze both before evaluating their legal status
and the disputant countries’ level of commitment to each of them.
The PRC-Philippines Joint Statement is a declaration of the policy of both parties. In it, both China and the Philippines express their
intent to settle disputes “in a peaceful and friendly manner through
consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect,” to not use
force or the threat of force, to increase cooperation, and to “settle
10
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their bilateral disputes in accordance with the recognized principles
of international law, including UNCLOS.”11 The Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties employs similar language, though this document
applies to all members of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Vietnam) and China. Like the Joint Statement, the Declaration
calls for equality, respect, renunciation of force or the threat of force,
increased cooperation, and using international institutions and rules,
including UNCLOS, to resolve disputes.12 However, the Declaration
also states the parties’ intention to work for conservation of wildlife,
the reduction of piracy, the development of international regimes, and
other issues of mutual concern even in the absence of a final resolution.13
The Joint Statements and 2002 Declaration have fewer legal provisions to explore, and instead mostly contain positive rhetoric and
expressions of goodwill. Although most of the provisions are unambiguous, their legal status is not. Kittichaisaree, for example, argues
that these declarations and statements have something akin to the
force of law based on a precedent set by the International Court of
Justice in cases involving nuclear testing.14 In making declarations,
the court found that “when it is the intention of the state making the
declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State thenceforth being legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration.”15 This is a mostly convincing argument: each provision in the 2002 Declaration, for example,
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is prefaced with phrases such as “the parties are committed to” and
“the parties undertake to.”16
Despite this precedent, however, these statements cannot be
considered legally binding in the same way that the aforementioned
treaties are. Most of the language in these statements is ambiguous
and rhetorical, and to the degree that the parties commit themselves
anything, it is to mutual goals rather than particular courses of action.
It is much easier to argue that any given course of action is consistent
with vague goals of cooperation and respect than it is to argue that it
is consistent with legally phrased restrictions on behavior.
Whatever their status, however, these agreements and joint statements offer a window into the priorities of China and the ASEAN
nations. All parties are clearly worried about tensions spiraling out
of control, and the ASEAN countries are understandably wary of
provoking China. Militarily, China has the strength (assuming the
U.S. does not intervene) to take over the entire South China Sea; economically, China also has weapons to deploy against Southeast Asia.
If there were a war in the area, ASEAN would not only lose territory
and prestige, but its economic livelihood would also be threatened.
China, on the other hand, is also hesitant to go to war. The fear of a
rising China, already high in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere, would
reach a fever pitch if it were to flex its muscle by imposing its will
in the South China Sea. And just like ASEAN, China would be hurt
by the loss of trade in the area and beyond, where it would likely be
the subject of international sanctions. Perhaps most importantly, in
the event of war, China would lose much of the rapport that it has
developed in the international community through cooperative participation in international organizations and regimes.
The most important clues that these documents give us, however,
is that they all emphasize working through the UN and other international organizations, particularly through the UN Law of the Sea.
Because all parties have agreed to pursue a settlement that conforms
to the principles and provisions of the Convention, understanding it
is essential to predicting and influencing the future of the dispute.
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III. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the
most important document bearing on relations in the South China
Sea: all parties have agreed that any final settlement will be based
on its principles. The first round of this convention was held in 1956,
but for our purposes, the most important document is UNCLOS III,
which was adopted in 1982 and went into effect in 1994.17 Many of
its provisions were merely codifications of common practices, but
there were some innovations, and many issues that previously had
been matters of tradition and convention were given the force of
law. Most importantly, UNCLOS III defines territorial waters and
rights to waterways, which neither of the previous rounds of treaties
had done. States were given different rights in six different areas:
internal waters, territorial waters, archipelagic waters, contiguous
waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves.18 In internal waters, such as rivers and lakes, states have full sovereignty, and
no other states have rights of passage. In territorial waters, which
extend 12 nautical miles from every shore, states have sovereignty,
but all other states have the right of “innocent passage”; that is, any
state can sail non-military ships (except in specific straits deemed
necessary for military transport, in which case military presence
is permitted), but these ships may not stop or engage in commercial activities without permission.19 Rights in archipelagic waters
are especially important in the South China Sea. Archipelagic
waters are basically the waters bounded by the outermost islands in
an archipelago. Archipelagic waters are treated similarly to internal waters, but other states still have the right of innocent passage
through them. The difference between archipelagic and territorial
waters is that two islands may be over 24 nautical miles apart, but if
17
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they are considered to be in one archipelago, the state will still have
territorial rights between them.20 The contiguous zone extends 12
nautical miles beyond territorial waters, and in these areas, states
can enforce their own laws regarding pollution, taxation, customs,
and immigration.21 In a state’s exclusive economic zone, which
extends 200 nautical miles from the shore, states have full economic
rights, including fishing, mineral, and other resource rights. Finally,
a state has exclusive mineral rights on the entire continental shelf
(with some exceptions) extending from its shores, though fishing
and other activities are not regulated. Most importantly, all of these
rights, including those associated with archipelagic waters, apply to
all and only habitable pieces of land.22
These provisions clearly put a premium on occupying islands
and making them habitable. This is one of the primary reasons that
small military contingents from Taiwan, the PRC, the Philippines,
and other countries are stationed on rocks that would naturally be
underwater at high tide; having a qualifying piece of land extends a
state’s economic and political rights that much farther into the open
ocean. Unfortunately, UNCLOS does not give clear rules applying
to situations in which these zones overlap. In the South China Sea,
the problem of overlapping zones has been addressed only in the
Malacca Strait, which has been designated a strategically important
area in which all states have a right to military transport.
There are three primary reasons that China is likely to abide by
and work within the framework of these provisions of UNCLOS.
First, China has signed and ratified the treaty (as have all other countries with claims in the South China Sea. The U.S., another important
actor in the region, has signed the treaty but not ratified it), and it has
a good track record of keeping such treaties. Second, several other
statements and agreements, such as the 2002 Code of Conduct and
China’s joint statement with the Philippines in 1995, have mentioned
the importance of working within the framework of UNCLOS to
20
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resolve differences.23 Third, the Chinese government’s public rhetoric and actions emphasize that it considers the treaty advantageous
for China. The provisions give China the right to military transport
through the Malacca Strait and through any waters in the South
China Sea except those that are within a non-overlapping portion of
another country’s territorial waters. It has used these rights to protect
its security interests in the Indian Ocean, to patrol the South China
Sea, and to occasionally stage naval exercises in the area. Because
of the advantages the Law of the Sea affords Beijing and its desire
to seem supportive of international organizations, China can be
expected to respect and support these rights as a necessary price to
pay for the advantages it believes that UNCLOS provides.
Though all parties have expressed their commitment to resolve
disputes under the framework of UNCLOS, the formal dispute resolution channels under the Convention have not been used. UNCLOS
III establishes three mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes: the UN Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, and ad hoc dispute resolution tribunals. All
of these mechanisms, however, are venues of optional jurisdiction,
meaning that they can only be used if both parties agree to be bound
by their decisions. Unsurprisingly, China has steadfastly refused to
be bound by the decisions of any of these chambers. This refusal
makes its frequent avowals to resolve the South China Sea dispute
within the framework of the Law of the Sea somewhat hollow and
raises questions about its sincerity. By committing all parties to
resolve the dispute through UNCLOS but then refusing to submit the
dispute to any UNCLOS-approved channels, China is simply perpetuating the status quo, a course that is decidedly in Beijing’s favor.
In the following sections, however, I will show how ASEAN
may be able to break this stalemate. Though it may be regarded by
some as legal trickery, there is a mechanism under UNCLOS that
may allow these countries to force the International Seabed Authority, a chamber created by the Law of the Sea, to make a binding
decision about international boundaries in the South China Sea even
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if China does not agree to appear before the chamber or be bound by
its decisions.

IV. The International Seabed Authority
Part XI Section 4 of UNCLOS III established the International
Seabed Authority, which began operations in 1994. The Authority
is headquartered in Jamaica and has established branches in several
countries across the world. It is governed by an Assembly, in which
all 159 signatories to the
Law of the Sea are represented, and a Council, composed of 36 countries with
particular interests in seabed exploration. Contract
applications for open ocean
mining are evaluated and
approved by the Council,
which turns them over to
the ISA’s Legal and TechFigure 1. South China Sea claims
nical Commission upon
receipt and bases its decision primarily on the Commission’s recommendation.24 The Commission itself is composed of 25 experts in
law and the science of deep-sea mining elected by the Council. These
members come from many different countries but are meant to act
in their capacity as experts and not as representatives of their states.
The Commission also recommends regulations and rules regarding
the exploitation of certain types of mineral deposits. To date, it has
ratified rules for only three types of mineral deposits: polymetallic
nodules, polymetallic sulfides, and ferromanganese crusts.25
The ISA’s mandate is to “organize and control activities in the
Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the

24
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Area.”26 The Area is defined as the seabed and waters outside the
jurisdiction of any nation: that is, any area beyond the furthest extent
of any state’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Significantly, the convention itself does not establish the status of disputed areas. Perhaps
this is because they did not anticipate a circumstance in which one
country would dispute another’s claim not with its own counterclaim
but with an argument that the area in question is in fact beyond any
national jurisdiction. However, this is precisely the dispute in the
South China Sea. All ASEAN countries have expressed some willingness to agree to a plan whereby UNCLOS provisions would be
applied as though all islands and waters in the South China Sea were
considered res nullius, or newly discovered islands, and if such a
policy were formally adopted by ASEAN, there would still be an
area that belonged to no state (fig. 1).27 The existence of this “no
man’s land” will be crucial to my argument for ASEAN’s options
under the Law of the Sea.
The International Seabed Authority’s mandate is quite vague,
and there is no consensus on the precise limits of its activities. Some
scholars argue that its authority is strictly limited by article 82.4,
which states that the authority shall arrange for an equitable distribution to all nations of resources taken from the Area.28 Others take
a more expansive view. Whatever the theoretical powers of the ISA
are, however, in practice the ISA has interpreted its responsibility to
organize activities in the Area very broadly. All development and
exploration of resources in the Area seabed, for example, must first
be approved by and contracted with the Authority. Contract applications are submitted to the Legal and Technical Commission, which
evaluates whether the proposed work conforms to the regulations
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governing exploration or mining of the relevant mineral.29 If the
contract conforms to these regulations, the Commission accepts the
application, and the Council then approves the contract.
To date, the Authority has approved nine contracts. Most are
in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone south of Hawaii, which contains
the world’s richest polymetallic sulfide deposits and most abundant polymetallic nodules.30 The only other other area that has been
opened for exploration and development is in the Indian Ocean just
to the southeast of the Maldives. The contract for this area, which
was concluded with the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research
and Development Association in May 2001, has been widely controversial, because many observers, particularly India, have interpreted
it as part of China’s effort to extend its reach to south Asia and blunt
India’s influence. The Authority’s relevance to the South China Sea
is particularly striking considering that in this case, China used mineral exploration contracting as a geopolitical tool.

V. ASEAN and the International Seabed Authority
If all members of ASEAN with claims in the South China Sea
can agree to a framework that includes the application of boundaries
based on the Law of the Sea (as shown by the dotted lines in figure
1) a contract with the International Seabed Authority may offer a
unique opportunity for them to legitimate their claims. If ASEAN
applies for an exploratory contract in the area claimed by China but
not by any other Southeast Asian nation, when considering the contract, the ISA (or more particularly, the Legal and Technical Commission) may be forced to decide whether the piece of seabed in
question is indeed part of the Area, that is, whether it falls within
any nation’s jurisdiction. To decide that it is in the Area would not
only invalidate China’s claim to that particular part of the ocean,
it would also legitimate ASEAN’s broader claims to a delineation
29
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of boundaries based strictly on exclusive economic zones evaluated
from each country’s coasts.
For such a result to be possible, however, ASEAN would have
to do considerable preparation beforehand. Any contract application
that it submitted would have to conform to the Authority’s regulations in every detail. This would be particularly important because
it is unlikely that a functionalist institution like the ISA would relish being asked to step into the middle of one of the most important
boundary disputes in the world. If the application could be rejected
on a technicality, therefore, it is likely that the Commission would
reject it on that basis to avoid having to decide the limits of
national jurisdiction.
If the application were sufficiently foolproof, however, the regulations and procedures of the Authority suggest that the Commission
would either have to decide on its own the limits of China’s EEZ
or refer the matter to the Law of the Sea Tribunal for a decision.
The regulations for the exploration of polymetallic nodules state that
after an application is received, the secretary general first reviews
the application.31 If the secretary general determines that it conforms
to the Convention and the regulations, he or she will give notification and send it on to the Legal and Technical Commission. The
Commission then confirms that proper assurances have been made,
that the project will not pose a significant danger to marine life, and
that the project conforms to several other technical specifications.
The regulations state that “if the Commission. . .determines that the
proposed plan of work for exploration meets the requirements. . .
the Commission shall recommend approval of the plan of work for
exploration to the Council.”32 In other words, if the applications do
not violate the Convention or the regulations, then the Commission
shall recommend approval. The Council’s subsequent approval is
largely pro forma.
Considering the geopolitical consequences of having some areas
determined to be outside of national jurisdiction, one might assume
that disputed areas are off-limits for exploration. However, whether
31

See Supra, at 4.

32

Supra at 15.
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because of simply an
oversight or because of a
conscious decision, neither the Convention in its
definition of the Area nor
the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration
for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area contain
any mention of disputed
areas. The closest guid- Figure 2. The International Seabed Authority’s
ance here is the state- map of the South China Sea. The black lines
ment that the Area is any represent the limits of any national jurisdiction.
part of the ocean beyond
any states’ jurisdiction. The International Seabed Authority, in its
role as approver of contracts, can reasonably be expected to decide if
certain parts of the seabed fall within the Area, and if ASEAN can
force the ISA to make such a decision, it seems most likely that the
Authority will not side with China, as we will see in the next section.

VI. The Case for ASEAN
There is not enough space here to give a complete analysis of
the case for and against China’s claims to the South China Sea. Such
analyses have also already been given in great detail by experts in
the field on both sides of the issue. In this section, I aim only to give
enough evidence to show that an argument for boundary delimitation based on the law of the sea is prima facie stronger than China’s
argument based on historical records and archaeological discoveries.
First, it seems reasonable to accept the Law of the Sea principles
unless there is compelling evidence or extraordinary circumstances
that necessitate adopting some different rule. In the South China Sea
dispute, China claims that because it has historical maps purporting
to show the South China Sea islands as part of its territory as well as
archaeological evidence that the Chinese had visited the islands as
early as the voyages of Zheng He in the early 15th century, its claims
extend much farther into the South China Sea than they would if
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the EEZ were simply calculated with the islands being considered
res nullius.33 As can be seen in figure 1, China’s claims extend even
to the beaches of Malaysia! If this evidence cannot be conclusively shown to support China’s claim to historical ownership of the
islands, therefore, our preference prima facie should be for treating
the islands as res nullius and drawing the EEZs accordingly.
China’s evidence is not nearly as conclusive as Beijing claims
that it is. As the government of Vietnam has argued, the map that the
Chinese have produced gives no reason to believe that the islands
belong to China.34 In fact, it seems that if they are labeled or demarcated at all, the map indicates that these islands were outside of
China. The archaeological evidence is similarly ambiguous. In the
pre-modern era, Chinese commerce was common throughout East
Asia, and communities of overseas Chinese have existed in Malaysia
and the Philippines for centuries.35 A Chinese artifact, therefore, is
almost as likely to have come from any other nations in the area as
it is to have come from China. Furthermore, even if these artifacts
could be shown to have come from China, they are more likely to
have been dropped by a ship temporarily docking on the island than
to have come from a permanent settlement. In the time period that
the artifacts are dated to, it is unlikely that a community on even
the largest of the islands would be able to survive because of how
isolated it would have been.
Other members of ASEAN, such as Vietnam, which occupied
the Paracels until the Chinese invaded, have equally valid claims
to many of the islands. And many, including the Philippines, have
argued that because of the islands long occupation by the Japanese,
World War II effectively made the area a res nullius.36 Indeed, when
33

See Historical Evidence to Support China’s Sovereignty over Nansha
Islands, Ministry Foreign Aff. China (Nov. 17, 2000) http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19231.htm# (China).

34

See Ian James Storey, Creeping Assertiveness: China, Philippines, and the
South China Sea Dispute, Contemp. Southeast Asia , Apr. 1999, at 95, 95.
(Sing.).
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See id.at 95.

36

See id. at 95.
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Japan and the United Sates signed the San Francisco treaty, which
ended World War II, the islands of the South China Sea were ordered
to be returned to their rightful owners, but unlike almost every other
square inch of former Japanese territory, no nation was named as
owner of the islands.37 The Philippines has the additional claim that,
as an archipelagic nation, the Spratly islands more naturally belong
to it, seeing that geologically they are arguably part of the same
archipelago.
In addition to this evidence based on international law and precedent that the area should be evaluated based on the Law of the Sea
EEZ lines, there is also good evidence that the International Seabed
Authority does not consider China’s claims totally valid. And since
under the scenario I have outlined the Authority’s opinion is the
essential element in legitimating ASEAN’s claims, this evidence is
extremely important. According to the ISA’s own maps (fig. 2), part
of the South China Sea is outside all national boundaries.38 It would
be very difficult for the Authority to deny ASEAN’s application on
the basis that the area is in dispute or on the basis that it belongs to
China when its own maps show it to be beyond any state’s EEZ.
Even if one does not accept this evidence as conclusive, it still
seems that in the absence of compelling evidence either way, it is
most reasonable to start from a clean slate and simply evaluate the
area based on the Law of the Sea as it is currently written. In other
words, the burden is on China to prove its claims. If it cannot do so
(as is likely), then evaluating boundaries as though the area were
res nullius is the only principled and tenable compromise position.
It therefore is likely that if the International Seabed Authority did
agree to decide whether the piece of seabed in question were part
of the Area, it would decide that at least some portion of the sea is
beyond all international boundaries. This would invalidate China’s
strident claims and pave the way for a settlement that favors ASEAN.
37

See Mulilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan Art. 2, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T.
3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf.
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See International Seabed Authority , http://www.mapserver.isa.org.jm/
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VII. Conclusion
The dispute in the South China Sea has only become more
intractable since it began, and if decisive steps are not taken, the situation is likely to continue to deteriorate. The discovery of important
oil reserves and the increasing geopolitical importance of the region
have raised the stakes tremendously. Because China is quickly rising as a military and economic force in the region, ASEAN can no
longer afford to simply sit back and hope that the crisis turns out in
its favor.
As I have shown, one option that has striking legal benefits is
pursuing a contract for mineral exploration from the International
Seabed Authority. Though it is certainly an unconventional avenue
for legitimating or arbitrating territorial claims, the provisions of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Authority’s regulations on mineral exploitation are written in such a way that the ISA
may be compelled to decide whether the center of the South China
Sea belongs to China or is the “common heritage of mankind” and
falls beyond any national jurisdiction.39 China has refused several
times to have its disputes adjudicated before the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, and this response is unsurprising and
even rational. After all, Beijing knows that its claims are contrary
to commonly accepted international norms and laws and unlikely
to stand up to international legal scrutiny. Because any settlement
must be based on the Law of the Sea, appealing to the International
Seabed Authority may be the only peaceful way for ASEAN to force
China to live up to the international agreements it claims to uphold.

39

Wines, supra note 7.

Federal Education Mandates: A Constitutional
Renovation of No Child Left Behind
Ryan Bakow1

I

n July 2011, a massive cheating scandal in the Atlanta public education system shocked the nation and became fodder for critics
of federal education programs. Governor Nathan Deal ordered
an investigation that eventually implicated one hundred and seventyeight teachers and principals, alleging that they had systematically
changed answers on standardized tests for more than ten years. Prior
to the school district’s exposure, Atlanta was thought to be advancing considerably: Atlanta’s superintendent, Beverly Hall, was named
Superintendent of the Year in 2009. The city was considered a model
for the success of the No Child Left Behind Act2 (NCLB) legislation,
when in actuality, this reputation was largely falsified.3
Atlanta’s failure is one unfortunate example of the problems
associated with federal education mandates like NCLB; it also demonstrates how such mandates can be a violation of federalism and
may even encroach on sacrosanct constitutional boundaries.4 The
Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that public education is with-
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in the domain of the state,5 but the reality is that under the current
system states are mostly reliant on federal funding to support their
schools. Accordingly, federal funds have essentially become an
instrument of control used alternatively for reward and punishment.
This reliance on federal funds provides the federal government with
significant latitude in its legislative power and scope. In fact, federal
funding is often a sufficient incentive for states to accept federal programs which may or may not be properly under federal jurisdiction.
This “carrot-and-stick” approach is problematic in two key
ways: first, mandates frequently do not include enough funding for
states to accomplish the federal government’s goals. These unfunded
mandates place undue burden on the states and directly oppose the
“general welfare” intended by the Spending Clause.6 Second, even
when federal mandates are sufficiently funded, the importance of
the attached funding creates a situation where the mandate supersedes state education law; thus, it blurs the line between mandate
and legislation.7 Essentially, the federal government legislates under
the guise of funded mandates. The constitutionality of this practice
is unclear and will be the primary issue addressed within this article.
Federally funded, and by extension unfunded, mandates have
the force of law and therefore should be subject to constitutional
constraints. This article examines recent Supreme Court decisions
that discuss the role of the federal government in public education.
Recent court challenges regarding NCLB offer an excellent case
study concerning the validity of federal mandates. These cases
indicate that federal mandates have the force of law due to the
5

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that if Congress has power to regulate both crime
and education, as they seem to be implying, then there is no end to their
power under the Commerce Clause. Thus, he affirmed the decision of The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that in banning guns from school
areas Congress had exceeded its constitutional power.

6
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centralize power. Most often a statute is considered the general welfare if
it is universally applicable as well as generally supported).

7
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exceptional leverage created by federal funding. In most cases, the
consequence of non-compliance is a withdrawal of funding for key
programs, effectively debilitating the state’s education programs.8 If
federal mandates have the force of law, it follows that federal mandates ought to operate within the Constitution similar to standard
law. Therefore, federal mandates should not be acceptable with
respect to education.
I will organize the article as follows: (I) First, I examine federal
mandates and explain why constitutionality ought to be the primary
consideration of their legality. This will include the argument that
federal mandates can gain the force of law. (II) Next, I demonstrate
that NCLB is an example of a coercive federal mandate, since the
opt-out was unrealistic and in most cases would have been debilitating to local education systems. (III) I then apply several recent
decisions to the question of the constitutionality of federal education mandates (specifically NCLB), showing that significant judicial
support exists for the position that education is strictly a state issue.
(IV) Finally, I consider certain implications of this position on both
federal funding as well as future court decisions concerning federalism and education policy.

I. Federal Mandates:
For many years, the Federal Legislature has used federal mandates to implement national policies and programs. These mandates
are similar to law in their construction and passage and are obeyed
as law with few exceptions. Federal mandates are passed as a part of
legislative bills or joint resolutions and are intricately tied with decisions made by the Appropriations Committee.9 Mandates are a func8

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) In the few cases where states
have not fully complied with federal mandates, the consequences have
most often been financial. The exception is when the federal government
grants a waiver to that state such as in the recent case of President Obama
granting 10 state waivers concerning the No Child Left Behind Act.

9

Clark G. Radatz, Funding State and Federal Mandates, Legislative
Reference Bureau, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/ib/96ib3.pdf (Last
visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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tion of budgets and are frequently made a prerequisite for receiving
funding.10 Federal mandates have steadily increased in number since
1960. In January 1996, the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) observed “more than 200 separate mandates… involving about 170 federal laws reaching into every nook
and cranny of state and local activities.” In a separate report, they
identified “3,500 decisions involving state and local governments
relating to more than 100 federal laws….”11 Mandates have become
an intricate part of federal oversight although they are technically
not law.
Federal laws and mandates are very similar in both their method
of passage and their power; the principal differences between them
are the consequences associated with noncompliance. For instance,
if a state were to disregard a federal law, the matter would likely go
to a federal court which then decides whether to enforce it (often
by force) or to support the state.12 On the other hand, the federal
government cannot forcibly compel a state to uphold such a federal mandate; they only have the power to withdraw the associated
funding.13 There are two types of mandates: unfunded mandates
are those law-like institutions and statutes, which are given to the
states without compensation or funding but may be attached to other
program funding (such as federal highway provisions), and funded
mandates, which are given with the necessary funding to carry out
the proposed action.
10

Id. at 3.

11

The Role of Federal Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations: A Preliminary ACIR Report, U.S. Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental
Relations (Feb. 16, 2012 11:00 AM), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/
Mandates.html.
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Wiley A. Branton, Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 The Journal of Negro Education 3 (1983) (After the landmark
supreme court case Brown v. Board of Education, Dwight D. Eisenhower
ordered the national guard to compel the admittance of nine black students
to a Little Rock High School. On their first day, the students attended class
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Unfunded mandates must be accompanied by legal justification
as to why there is an absence of funds, except when the mandate is an
enumerated federal power. For example, in United States v. Lopez,14
the Court ruled that Congress had not provided “sufficient justification” of a substantial relationship between the Gun-Free School
Zones Act15 and congressional commerce power, thus showing that
the courts still enforce constitutional compliance. This tradition was
later codified in the 1996 Mandate Reform bill16 in which Congress
sought “to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration
by Congress, of federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate federal funding.”17 In cases where the funded or unfunded mandate is not an enumerated federal power, states
must be given the necessary funds to carry out the federal program.
Although federal mandates themselves are not binding, they are
often part of legislative acts such as bills and joint resolutions.18 State
and local governments have in the past, been able to ‘opt-out’ of
federal mandates. However, because they are connected in appropriations to significant funding, sometimes unrelated to the law in
question, states rarely attempt noncompliance. When such attempts
are made, however, federal mandates may carry considerable repercussions. For example, in 1987 the state of South Dakota sued the
federal government over the loss of federal highway funds. This
punishment was administered in response to the state’s refusal to
change the minimal drinking age to 21 as was required by federal
statute.19 Ultimately, the courts upheld the federal mandate because

14

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

15

Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, H.R. 3757, 101st Cong. § 1702
(1990).

16

Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1995).

17

Id at 2.
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Id at 3.
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National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C.S. § 158 (1984).
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they considered it to be in the general welfare.20 In order to keep
millions of dollars of necessary funding for their highways, South
Dakota was forced to accept the federally mandated change although
it was against the wishes of the state.21
This case marked a turning point in the way in which Congress
created and administered statutes, ushering in the age of federal
mandates. Since South Dakota v. Dole, there have been hundreds of
federal mandates and, most noteworthy, almost uniform compliance.
As one of the scholastically worst school districts in the nation, the
Atlanta school district had little chance for success within the federal
system. Poor testing and dropout rates would have resulted in school
closures and significant funding cuts. Why would the state willfully
enter into such a losing system? Why would they sacrifice probity
for the appearance of improvement rather than customizing a state
system? The answer is the same as in the South Dakota case: there
is no reasonable alternative funding outside of the related federal
mandate. The financial consequences of noncompliance are simply
too great.
Significantly, the 1996 Mandate Reform Bill does not provide
any meaningful restriction for federally funded mandates. In fact, in
the last several decades funded mandates have grown significantly
in proportion to statute. Additionally, the implementation of funded
mandates has often been upheld by the courts, as in South Dakota v.
Dole. In one noteworthy part of the majority decision the judges state
that, “economic coercion could be a factor that invalidates an otherwise legitimate exercise of the spending power.”22 Despite ruling
in favor of the government, the judges recognized that the price
of non-compliance could be high enough to be considered compul20

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The secretary of transportation Elizabeth Dole. The petitioners alleged that this statute violated the
spending clause found in U.S. constitution article 1 section 8 clause 1. In
their decision, the appellate court upheld the defendants saying that this
statute was constitutional pursuant to the “general welfare” of the several
states.
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sion, although this threshold was never explicitly created. In United
States v. Butler, Judge Owens, in the majority opinion stated that,
“The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy.”23 Ruling on agricultural subsidies, the reasoning
of the court was as follows: “If the cotton grower elects not to accept
the benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him. The result may well be financial
ruin.”24 Again, the courts concluded that funded mandates have the
potential to reach compulsory levels.
Despite the possibility of becoming de facto legislation, federally funded mandates are rarely challenged or relinquished. Thus,
there has been little need for the federal government to justify its use
of mandates, except in cases where they are unfunded and non-enumerated. This is likely the case because federal funding has become
increasingly vital to state government functionality. That is, although
federally funded mandates have become more and more compulsive,
the states are less and less inclined to challenge them due to the risk
of losing millions—and in some cases billions—of dollars in federal funding. There is nothing constitutional which prohibits federal
coercion of state law via economic or other incentives. On the other
hand, the courts have made it clear that there exists a point at which
federal incentives essentially gain the force of law.25 In individual
cases, this happens when rejecting payments may lead to “financial
ruin;”26 for states, these conditions are the same. If rejecting federal
funding as a result of opting out of a federal program cripples or
threatens ruin on the state system, then such a mandate has gained
the force of law.
The deficiency in past court rulings is that there is no definitive
estimate of the threshold where a funded federal mandate becomes
compulsive. However, there have been several cases which dem23

US v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936). In this decision, Owens clarifies that
while Congress may tax and apportion funding for the ‘general welfare’,
they may not use taxation as a means of control over state powers.
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onstrate that any system of federal funding that is contingent on a
set of requirements, and which has no viable alternative, must be
compulsive. On the other hand, would an alternative opt-in system
which receives equivalent federal funding be any less compulsive?
The answer is that federal funding in any form has the potential to
create dependency. In the case of education, Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the subsequent No Child Left
Behind Act provide hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funds
to states each year. States that opt-out of this system would lose their
funding, and this would seem to be in violation of the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution. In short, if a funded federal mandate
is not inherently in the federal domain, and if it exacts debilitating
penalties in case of non-compliance, then it becomes compulsive and
thus non-constitutional. This will be discussed further in section IV.

II. No Child Left Behind:
One of the most important federal mandates for the U.S. education system is NCLB.27 Conceived by the Bush administration, NCLB
amended and reauthorized the already existing ESEA.28 The purpose
of NCLB was to “ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education.”29 NCLB is
a “standards” based education reform, and accordingly requires all
schools that receive federal funding to comply with national standardized testing and school evaluation. The federal government creates—and states administer—requisite standardized testing. School
benchmarks are created by the federal government and administered

27

No Child Left Behind Act 115 § 1425 (2002).

28

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act 79 § 27 (1965). ESEA was
renewed several times in the legislature, the most recent reincarnation being No Child Left Behind.

29

20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001).
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by the states.30 Additionally, this act reauthorizes Title I funding,31
mandates that teachers be “highly qualified,” institutes a new reading program, redistributes education funding to focus on low income
areas, and allows the schools greater leeway in their use of federal
funds. All states were automatically required to implement this federal program in place of ESEA.32
Both the accolades and punishments in the program were implemented via financial incentives, much as other federal mandates.
Unfortunately, the incentive structure ultimately had some negative
consequences. In the Atlanta School District, teachers felt pressured
to keep test-scores artificially high.33 In this case, the schools and
students were compelled to make improvements according to NCLB
in order to extend and maintain their funding. As a result, they had to
resort to cheating in order to keep their jobs and their schools open.
It may be that fundamental change in a school’s academic progress
requires more than just an increase in funding and more than just
a few years. The quality of an education system likely has to do
with the socio-economic, cultural, and familial environment to which
the child is exposed. If this is the case, then it stands to reason that
education policy must be made and adapted to local circumstances.
Educators and lawmakers in Georgia and other areas understood that
NCLB would ultimately limit their funding whether they complied
or not. Their actions epitomize the essence of NCLB, which is that it
has the force of law. Not abiding by the requirements of this federal
mandate, or opting out, would have resulted in the loss of significant
funding; in most instances, a majority of state education funding. It
is a case where the “power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is
the power to coerce or destroy.”34
30

Id. (This act was initially accompanied by 42.2$ billion in funding which
increased until about 2007 when there were significant spending cuts).

31
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The financial incentives themselves are a systemic problem
which applies to federal mandates in general; however, NCLB has
had other significant problems since its inception. The principal
problem as presented in appellate courts was the lack of funding
for certain NCLB requirements. This has manifested itself in two
ways: (1) Higher standards and specific tests required by the act were
found by some states to cost more than the money allocated; and (2)
many of the provisions were not funded at all, thereby increasing the
burden on the states.35 Ultimately this resulted in several lawsuits, of
which none was more definitive than State of Connecticut v. Margaret Spellings, Secretary of Education.36
While many states simply accepted the No Child Left Behind
Act because of the financial incentives or for other reasons, for many
states it required significant reformation. Connecticut’s educational
system was one of the most successful in the country because of their
high standards and state-specific testing. NCLB, however, required
that the state make non-essential changes, for example implementing
additional testing. Connecticut attempted to receive a waiver from
the Secretary of Education, Margaret Spellings, because it already
had its own standardized testing that ensured test scores well above
the national average, but requests for waivers were denied. Thus,
Connecticut became the first state to file a lawsuit against the federal
government because it lacked the funding necessary to carry out the
required annual testing for elementary schools. Connecticut’s complaint was that the federal government had violated the unfunded
mandates prohibition of NCLB by requiring Connecticut’s schools
to comply with unfunded standards.37 Furthermore, the cost of noncompliance was significant. The federal government could have
withheld $435,946,380; this represents a substantial portion of the
state’s education budget. This federal funding is tied to Title I funding, and was used as leverage to force the state to accept NCLB.38
35

Larry Abramson, Funding Stagnant for No Child Left Behind Program,
NPR, (Last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
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Thus, in August 2005, Connecticut challenged the federal government’s use of the Spending Clause.
The underlying question was whether the spending clause justified this educational program which would otherwise be left to the
states generally. Connecticut v. Spellings is a persuasive example
of the devastating consequences of non-compliance with a federal
mandate. Here the federal government had attempted to coerce a
state, in lieu of compelling them with statute, to act contrary to its
own will by withholding funds. The text of NCLB specifically states
that the state would not have to pay for implementation of the Act.
However, the federal government did not fund up to $41 million of
the actual cost.39 Additionally, non-compliance would have taken
away federal funding which had existed previously, essentially a tax
on the state. Despite this apparent contradiction, the federal government continued to justify the use of federal mandates in NCLB with
the Spending Clause.
In order for the federal government to justify NCLB pursuant
to the Spending Clause, it should be required to demonstrate that
NLCB is providing for the “general welfare” of the states.40 Connecticut needed to either show that this mandate violated the 1996
Unfunded Mandate Law or that it had become coercive in accordance with South Dakota v. Dole.41 As discussed in section one,
appellate case law offers no definition as to how many federal dollars
must be at stake in order to qualify as undue coercion. The Fourth
Circuit, however, has acknowledged that the theory of coercion is

39

William J. Mathis, The Cost of Implementing the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act, Peabody Journal of Education http://www.schoolfunding.
info/news/ federal/3-14-05ctnclbstudy.php3 (Feb. 2, 2012).
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since they are supporting the states and providing funds for public goods.
This was used as justification in several of the NCLB court cases).
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viable and that its explanation is persuasive.42 As such, it is an argument well-grounded in the Tenth Amendment’s reservation “to the
States respectively, or to the people” of those “powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States.”43 The State of Connecticut may very well be the first state
filing suit to have reached the phantom threshold between funding
and coercion.
Connecticut did not win the case44 because they did not adequately show that NCLB lacked required funding. However, the decision
showed that the education mandate had coercive force because it carried significant consequences in case of non-compliance. The Court’s
action also makes it clear that they considered NCLB the equivalent
of law. Similar cases followed the Connecticut ruling which further
substantiated the limitations inherent in federal mandates. Pontiac
v. Spellings claimed that NCLB was simply an unfunded mandate.45
The plaintiffs, the National Education Association along with several school districts from Michigan, Texas and Vermont, alleged that
although NCLB promises to cover all related costs, the states are
forced to assume a significant financial burden. On the other hand,
the cost of non-compliance was even greater. These cases exemplify
the debilitating tax which many federal mandates would incur in the
case of non-compliance. Using federal mandates, Congress has the
ability to circumvent the frontiers of its jurisdiction.

42

West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 289 F.3d 281,
286 (4th Cir. 2002).

43

U.S. Const. amend. X.

44

Connecticut v. Spellings, 549 F. Supp. 2d 161, 161 (U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
Dist. of Conn. 2008).

45

Sch. Dist. v. Spellings, No. 90-345, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253, at 2
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2005) (addressing the legitimacy of the funding status
of the No Child Left Behind Act), rev’d 584 F.3d 253 (2009).
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III. Enumerated Federal Education Powers?
Education is not a specifically enumerated power given to Congress.46 Administration over a state scholastic system should fall
under the authority of the Tenth Amendment.47 However, other
constitutional clauses have been used at various times to justify the
use of federal education mandates, especially the General Welfare
Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.48 Such justification is acceptable so long as it is certified by the courts. The
problem is that the technical difference between a law and a mandate
has eliminated the need for constitutional oversight.
Laws have been justified most often under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.49 This justification has dramatically expanded
federal power, but recent court decisions have also provided important insight into the defined limits of enumerated powers.50 There
are several cases which required the Courts to specify congressional
legislating limits. Two of the most influential cases that have been

46

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

47

439 N.E.2d 359, 370 (N.Y. 1982) [hereinafter Levittown] (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “primary concern for education was to be that of
the States rather than of the Union”).

48

See Stephen Monroe, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: “Reasonable Measures” Giving “Due Deference” to School Boards’ Decisions
in Cases Involving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 5
Seventh Circuit Rev. 581, 581 (2010).

49

See P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate
Takeovers — Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause,
14 Del. J. Corp. L. 499, 511 (Spring, 1989).

50

U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (the power given to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. This clause was not enacted very often in the first
several decades of the United States; however, it has since been regularly
used as a means of expanding congressional power. The Court has recognized that these powers must not infringe on the proper balance of federalism, although the history of the Court suggests a search for a defined limit
on the powers enumerated in the Commerce Clause.)
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centered on the Commerce Clause are United States v. Lopez51 and
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.52 The decisions in these
court cases both clearly state that Congress does not have constitutional authority over state education.53 Therefore, this power should
be left to the states under Tenth Amendment grounds.54
In the first case of US v. Lopez, Congress sought to extend its
authority over certain aspects of education pursuant to the Commerce Clause. At stake was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199055
which prohibited an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm
within school zone. In both the majority and minority opinion, the
justices clarify that education is not a federal power.56 The federal
government was unable to show that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
51

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (1995). (In 1992 Alfonzo Lopez Jr. was a 12th
grade student attending Edison high school in the state of Texas. Lopez
brought a loaded revolver with him to school and while at school Lopez
was confronted by school authorities. Lopez was then charged with violation of Gun-Free School Act. Lopez appealed the charges brought against
him, claiming the ruling exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals decision in favor
of Lopez.)

52

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1993). (The
lawsuit was filed against the school district of San Antonio and surrounding areas, by parents of the Edgewood Concerned Parent Association.
The Supreme Court held that a school-financing system based on local
property taxes was not an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. The majority opinion stated that
the Apellees did not sufficiently prove that education is a fundamental
right, that textually existed within the US Constitution, and could thereby
through the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, be applied to the several
States. The Court also found that the financing system was not subject to
strict scrutiny.)

53

Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 370 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that
“primary concern for education was to be that of the States rather than of
the Union”).

54

Id.

55

Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, H.R. 3757, 101st Cong. § 1702
(1990).

56

Id.

Federal Education Mandates

101

was related to commerce, and without such a justification, the Court
ruled that the government had exceeded its jurisdiction. This decision
is a precedent for limiting government to strictly enumerated powers.
The second influential court case was San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.57 This court case was centered on the division
of financial inequalities within the Texas public school system. The
wealthy areas of San Antonio and across Texas were able to provide a better education to their students than poorer areas, such as
in Edgewood, an area near San Antonio. The judges in this case
found that the appellees did not prove sufficiently that education was
a fundamental right. In other words, that the states have jurisdiction
over the administration of their own education system, including the
associated funding.
These cases show that the Court has historically sided against
education as a federal power. Such decisions suggest that the federal government has no power to legislate or impose regulations on
the education system of the several states; this also has implications
for federal funding. Although the implications of constitutionality of
funding will not be fully considered in this paper, it is the author’s
opinion that federal funding of education is not a violation of any
constitutional power so long as it is not conditional on unjustified
federal programs. If funding is constitutional, or allowed under the
General Welfare Clause, then all states ought to receive comparable funding.

IV. Eliminating Federal Mandates on Constitutional Grounds:
The important question in these cases is consistently related
to federalism. In one such case, West Virginia v. U.S. Department
of Health & Human Services,58 the state of West Virginia sued the
federal government claiming that the federal Medicaid program,
which required states to adopt an estate recovery program to recoup
Medicaid expenditures from deceased beneficiaries, violated the
57

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1993).

58

West Virginia v. United States Department of Health & Human Services,
289 F.3d 281, 1-2 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Tenth Amendment because it was “unduly coercive.”59 Although the
Fourth Circuit declined to recognize any such federal coercion, it
acknowledged that when dealing with federal mandates the coercion
theory was valid. In the majority decision the judges stated that, “A
law or congressional policy which is unduly coercive may violate
the Tenth Amendment if it deprives the State of any reasonable ability to regulate an area that is traditionally left to the State and outside the federal government’s enumerated powers.”60 This is a clear
statement that the federal government’s powers are bounded. This
decision also indicates that the deprivation of state power, whether
because of law or otherwise, is a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
A second influential court ruling comes from the state of New
York, in the case of Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy.61 Theodore and Pearl Murphy were the parents of a
special needs child who felt that the public high school of Arlington
was unacceptable. Accordingly, they placed him in a private school,
but the Arlington Central School District was unwilling to pay the
related expenses. The question brought to the Fourth Circuit was
whether or not the prevailing party ought to be reimbursed for expert
witness fees. The parents claimed that this was implied in the federal
Individual with Disabilities Act (IDEA) which stated that the prevailing party would be rewarded “reasonable attorneys’ fees.”62 The
courts reversed precedent and argued that the federal statute made
under the auspices of the spending clause should be interpreted narrowly. This is another example of how the courts recognize that federal power ought to be restricted in cases where mandates are not
based in constitutional law.
Several interesting things were considered in Murphy which
are applicable to the present discussion. The Fourth Circuit in their
59

Michael J. Pendell, How Far Is Too Far? The Spending Clause, The Tenth
Amendment, and the Education State’s Battle Against Unfunded Mandates, 71 Alb. L. Rev. 519, 535 (2008).

60

Id.

61

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v .Pearl Murphy, 548 U.S. 291
(2006).

62

Individual with Disabilities Act 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 (1990).
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majority decision state that the conditions for federal funds must
be set out “unambiguously.”63 In fact, they say that, “Legislation
enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract,” and therefore, to be bound by “federally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal funds must accept them “voluntarily and
knowingly.”64 The courts here emphasize that federal mandates must
be absolutely clear in their language both for the states and the courts
who must enforce the agreement. However, although the language of
the mandate may be contract-like, the state has little control over the
terms of the agreement. Therefore, the only authority under which
such a stipulation could be made under is constitutional. If this is
not the case, then such an agreement may be excessively and
unjustly burdensome to state functions and may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. 65
The argument of this paper rests squarely on the back of the previously mentioned majority opinion by Judge Owens who said that
“the power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy.”66 Another notorious Court decision stated something similar, that “the power to tax is the power to destroy.”67 Clearly the idea of coercion as a form of enforcement has and continues to
have broad application. Previous cases have shown that the federal
mandate system, and more specifically the withdrawal of funds as
a retributive act, can be excessively burdensome to states and individuals. Such cases have also demonstrated the destructive power of
the withholding of federal funds for vital programs such as highway
maintenance or school systems. Thus, it is up to the courts to act on
precedent and more firmly establish the balance of federalism via
creating a definitive threshold of coercive federal mandates.
63

Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981).

64

Id. at 17.

65

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

66

US v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936).

67

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) Ironically,
this case was a ruling made in favor of a federal institution; however, the
principle of taxation having destructive power is applicable in this case.
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Having established that federal mandates have the potential to
be compulsory even to the point of being as powerful as law, they
ought to be under the same restrictions as law. In regards to legislative authority, Congress is strictly restrained by the Constitution,
including federal amendments. The Tenth Amendment provides a
clear division between federal and state jurisdiction; however, federal mandates effectively bypass this separation of powers. Congress’
ability to enforce its will via financial sanctions effectively limits
state sovereignty and extends federal oversight. Therefore, both
funded and unfunded federal mandates, as acts of Congress, should
be strictly limited to only those powers enumerated in the United
States Constitution.

V. Conclusion:
The use of federal mandates began with the good intention of
administering federal funding for vital state programs such as education, but is now become a means of managing anything considered
a national issue.68 In this article, the authority of congress to distribute federal funding is not in question. Rather, the primary issue is
one of federalism. Given that federal funding can in some cases be
so great as to be compulsory, and that the removal of this funding
as a consequence of non-compliance can devastate state programs
which have grown dependent on funding patterns, one is led to conclude that federal mandates have power similar to law. On the other
hand, federal mandates are not restrained by constitutional limits as
are statutes. As a result, federal mandates given by Congress have
the theoretical power to circumvent the institution of federalism by
imposing almost any sort of mandate on state governments using
financial incentives.
The No Child Left Behind Act is one such case where the federal
government mandated an action which as a law would have been
outside of constitutional jurisdiction.69 The subsequent legal action
68

The Role of Federal Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations: A Preliminary ACIR Report supra note 10 at 3.

69

No Child Left Behind Act 115 § 1425 (2002).
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taken by Connecticut and others illustrates that, at least from a state
perspective, the withdrawal of federal funding constitutes a destructive and therefore coercive act. It is for this that one must conclude
that No Child Left Behind has the force of law. Using the means of
federally funded mandates, the federal government has successfully
circumvented the Tenth Amendment and is administering a statelevel program.70
It is apparent that the judicial debate concerning the legitimacy of federal mandates has not gone far enough. The Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act stipulated that federal mandates must cover
the costs of the programs which they implement;71 however, it has
only been recent Court decisions which have recognized the possibility that federal funding could be coercive. Congress habitually
administers programs via funded mandates which are not explicitly
defined federal powers and which may or may not be welcome by
the states. The cases highlighted in this article show that this has
previously been a non-issue because there are very few states who
would risk their funding by not accepting government mandates. For
those states who have challenged these provisions, there has been
only lukewarm success. Thus to preserve the fundamental role of
federalism, there needs to be a new discussion in the courts which
defines coercive funding and establishes a hard precedent for the use
of federal mandates.
In the absence of a definitive threshold that discriminates
between coercive and non-coercive federal mandates, the courts
ought to recognize that coercive mandates exist. While funding may
be provided by the federal government in accordance with the general welfare, there must be recognition that attaching a significant
portion of federal funds to a mandate gives that mandate law-like
properties. Additionally, taking away even trivial federal funding
from states as a penalty creates inequality between communities,
which is opposed to the “general” welfare. In short, federal mandates
70

U.S. Const. amend. X.

71

Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1995), supra
note 15; Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, H.R. 3757, 101st Cong. §
1702 (1990).
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cannot be treated as contracts, or if they are, they must be considered
as a legislative act. Therefore, it is the author’s recommendation that
federally funded mandates should be under the same constitutional
restrictions as is federal law. Following such a standard will provide
much needed clarity concerning federally mandated action and will
reinforce the institution of federalism, especially as it pertains
to education.

Unjustified Punishment: Juvenile Consensual
Sex Offenders and the Sex Offender Registry
Tyson Prisbrey1

T

he sexual offender registry that tracks and informs the public
of sexual offenders’ residential and other relevant information has recently attracted widespread attention and, in most
cases, support.2 The general purpose of the registry is to protect
potential victims by providing the automobile, residential, and personal identification information of dangerous sex offenders living
in their area.3 Studies have shown that the registry can deter nonoffenders from committing sexual crimes and reduces the frequency
of reported sexual crimes against local victims by keeping local
authorities informed on local sex offenders.4 The problem with the
registry is its punishment of those who might not be deserving of
such. When offenders are included on the sex offender’s registry,
they are publicly labeled as sex offenders by neighbors and others
in the community. I argue that not all sexual offenders should be
publicly labeled as such. In many cases, the punitive nature of the
registry felt by those on the registry and their families is not proportional to their crimes. The main focus of this article is to demonstrate

1

Tyson is an undergraduate student at BYU studying political science. He
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See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification
Laws, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 885, 885 (1995).
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See id. at 893.
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See J.J. Prescott and Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior? 54 J.L. & Econ. 161, 192
(2011). (This study found that the registry could have a positive impact,
but that the recidivism rate actually increases due to the registry).
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why juvenile consensual sexual offenders (JCSO) should not have to
register as sexual offenders.
Consider this 2009 case: a seventeen-year-old boy started dating
a fourteen-year-old girl while both were in high school. When the girl
became pregnant, a family member decided to take drastic measures
and informed the local police that a seventeen-year-old was engaging in sexual acts with their underage daughter. Even though the
sexual acts were consensual, the police arrested the young man for
statutory rape and he served three months in a prison boot camp for
the felony. But his punishment did not stop there. The state required
that he register as a sex offender on a publicly available database and
update his information every year.5
After the young man served his sentence, the young couple got
married and started a family. Although the man is now thirty-one
years old, he and his family still suffer because of his status as a
sex offender. After years of searching, the family finally found a
home 1,000 feet away from any area that children frequent, in accordance with the requirements of the state.6 Because of the registry,
the husband is forced to take lower-income employment, which
results in financial strain on the family. The father cannot coach his
daughter’s soccer team, nor can he pick his children up from school.
He cannot participate in church activities that involve children, and he
cannot participate in his son’s scouting activities. This family suffers
greatly because of the sex offender registration laws. This misery
will continue for life unless the family moves to a state that has a
limit on the number of years the father must register.7 To make matters worse, the registry is very difficult to appeal in court. This life
of continual embarrassment is all because he engaged in consensual
sexual acts with his high school sweetheart.8
5

See Stephanie Chen, After Prison, Few Places for Sex Offenders to Live,
Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16.

6

See Sex Laws Unjust and Ineffective: America has Pioneered the Harsh
Punishment of Sex Offenders. Does it Work?, Economist (Jan. 18, 2012,
2:24 PM), available at http://www.economist.com/node/14164614.

7

See O.C.G.A. § 42-1-19 (2010).

8

See Chen, supra note 4, at A16.
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As terrible as this sort of life sounds, this is exactly how many
who have committed consensual sexual acts as juveniles have to
live their lives under the current sexual offender policies in many
states. While the registry helps protect the public from dangerous
sex offenders, JCSOs who engage in consensual acts with another
should not be forced into this public humiliation. The registration
process for sexual offenders came into law as the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994.9 Registry laws vary between states, but most states
require past offenders to meet annually with local law enforcement
to update their residency and occupational information, as well as a
description of the car they drive.10 This information is open to the
public, via Internet, in order to provide those living near any sexual
offender the information needed to avoid letting their children have
contact with those registered. In recent years, this information has
become even more accessible; for example, there is now an application for smart phones that will show the picture and the residential
location of all sex offenders within a radius of a few miles.11 The
main intent of this easy access to the registry is to protect the public
from dangerous sexual offenders.12
I argue that JCSOs are not necessarily violent, dangerous criminals. Therefore, they should not have to register and be labeled as
sex offenders. There are numerous articles debating the effects and
problems of the registry in general. However, this article shows that
the registry is unconstitutional when applied to JCSOs. First, a brief
history of sex offender registry laws are included and an argument
that the registry is a penal act is presented. Upon the premise that the
9

See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(1994).
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See id. at § 14071.
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See Sex Offender Tracker: By BeenVerified.com, (Jan. 27, 2012) (downloaded using iTunes).
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See Ki Ma Heusser, Liam Berkowitz, and Ned Potter, Top-Selling
iPhone App: Sex Offender Locator, Abc News (Jan. 25, 2012,
9:36 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/
story?id=8187394&page=1#.TwYUu_LKiSp.
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registry is a punishment, I then argue that the registry is cruel and
unusual punishment when applied only to JCSOs, therefore classifying the registry as unconstitutional. To conclude the article, a proposal is written on how to improve the sex offender registry laws in
the country. The purpose of this article is to illustrate the flaws and
negative effects the law has on JCSOs, as well as the need for reform.

History of the Sex-Offender Registry
Sex offender registry laws have been in practice in five states
since 1986, and almost half of the states had some sort of registry by
1993.13 At that time, however, most states did not make the information available to the public. In the early 1990s, there were a series of
widely known child-abductions and molestations that sparked the
creation and modification of sex offender registry laws.14
In 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act was passed to establish
guidelines for states to track sex offenders.15 Named after an elevenyear-old boy who was a victim of a violent sexual crime in 1989,
the act requires states to track sexual offenders by implementing
a mandatory registration system for sexual offenders upon release
13

See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication
of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 163, 164 (2003).

14

See Rebecca Boone, Jury: Confessed Killer of Idaho Boy Can Get Death,
Usa Today, (last visited Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2008-08-22-1329036061_x.htm; Couey Guilty of Murdering
9-year-old Jessica Lunsford, Cnn Justice, (last visited Feb. 14, 2012),
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-03-07/justice/girl.slain_1_jessica-lunsfordjohn-evander-couey-mark-lunsford?_s=PM:LAW; James Barron, Vigil
for Slain Girl, 7, Backs a Law on Offenders N.Y. Times, (last visited Feb.
7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/03/nyregion/vigil-for-slaingirl-7-backs-a-law-on-offenders.html?ref=megankanka. (Some high
profile cases from the early 90s include Jacob Wetterling, Fusako Sano
-- who was held captive for nine years, two months -- Jaycee Lee Dugar
-- who was help captive for eighteen years -- and Carrie Lawson).

15

See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(1994).
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from custody.16 Requirements for the registry differ between states,
but every state registry updates the convicted sex-offenders’ address
regularly. This was not initially public information when this act was
first passed, but became public domain two years later.17 In 1996
Megan’s Law was added as an amendment to the Jacob Wetterling
Act.18 Named after a New Jersey girl who was a victim of sexual violence, this amendment directed states to allow for the sex offender
registry information to be made public.19
A decade after the passage of Megan’s Law, The Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 was passed. This act, named
after a Florida boy who was abducted in a shopping mall and later
murdered, is another amendment to the Jacob Wetterling Act. The
Adam Walsh Act provides states further guidelines on how to operate the sex offender registry; however, not every state has ratified this
federal act. Currently, there are only fifteen states that have ratified
this act.20 The Act classifies convicted sex offenders into a three-tier
system: the most serious and dangerous offenders being a tier three
classification, and the least dangerous being a tier one. Depending on classification, sexual offenders have different guidelines for
their registry and the duration of time for which they must register.21
16

See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(1994).

17

See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(1994).
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See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (Megan’s Law), Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110
Stat. 1345, 42 U.S.C. 14071 (d) (1996).

19

See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901
(2006); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act (Megan’s Law), Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110
Stat. 1345, 42 U.S.C. 14071 (d) (1996).

20
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http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/newsroom.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2012).
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While only a small number of states have ratified the Adam Walsh
amendment, some states have made their own changes to the system.
Some states have laws, commonly known as Romeo and Juliet
Laws, that protect the older participants in consensual sexual relationships as long as they meet some required stipulations (which
vary from state to state).22 This modification to the registry protects
the public by providing information on the whereabouts of dangerous sex offenders while helping to protect those on the registry like
JCSOs from public scrutiny and further punishment. For example,
Florida passed such a law in 2007 that stops the accused from being
listed as a sex offender.23 The younger of the two participants must
be between 14 and 17 years of age, a willing participant in the sexual
relationship, and no more than four years younger than the offender.
It also must be the only violation on the offender’s record.24 This
does not make the intimacy legal; those protected by the Romeo and
Juliet law still have to serve the punishment given for statutory rape.
However, it does protect the offender from the punishments associated with the sex offender registry.25 Twenty-four states have ratified
these laws, while other states, including the District of Columbia,
have no laws protecting JSCOs.26

22

See Romeo and Juliet Law & Legal Definition, US Legal (Feb. 2, 2012,
2:13 PM), http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/romeo-and-juliet-law/).

23

See Fla. Stat. § 943.04354 (2007).

24

See Romeo and Juliet Law & Legal Definition, USLegal, http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/ romeo-and-juliet-law/ (Feb. 2, 2012).

25

See id. Once those who are protected by the Romeo and Juliet law are
released from custody, they are not required to enlist in the sex offender
registry.

26

See Close-In-Age Exemptions to the Age of Consent, Age of Consent by
State, http://www.age-of-consent.info/?page_id=25 (Jan. 23, 2012). Other
acts and laws have been passed concerning the registration, but for the
intents and purposes of this article, these are the four pieces of legislation
that are discussed.
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Registry is a Punishment
The sex offender registry is punitive in nature. The registry
further disadvantages and restrains the convicted sex offender after
serving his or her time. Because of the stipulations of the law, many
aspects of sex offenders’ lives are affected. For example, special
limitations are placed on where they can live, and they are restricted
from attending any school activities or church functions when there
are children present, even if the children are their own. Many report
being fired or not being hired because of their sex offender status,
regardless of the severity of their crime.27
The Supreme Court, however, does not agree. This was confirmed in the Supreme Court decision of Smith v. Doe.28 John Doe
and his son, John Doe II, had been convicted sex-offenders prior to
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994 being passed.29 Under this
act, all sex offenders convicted before 1994 still had to register as
a sexual offender.30 Doe argued that this violated the ex post facto
clause because of the retroactive nature of the act.31 However, the
Court disagreed in a 6-3 decision stating that the act did not violate
the ex post facto clause because the registry is not a punitive act. The
Court reasoned that the act was intended to be a non-punitive means
of identifying offenders to ensure public safety. They acknowledged
that the availability of information about sex offenders may have a
“lasting and painful” impact, but argued that these negative consequences are a result of their conviction, not the registration system.32
The two dissenting opinions found the act to be penal. Justice
Ginsburg wrote that she would hold the registry as punitive in effect
27

See Stephanie Chen, After Prison, Few Places for Sex Offenders to Live,
Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16.

28

See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 106.

29
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30
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See id. at 91.

32
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because it involves an “affirmative disability or restraint.”33 She
argued that the registry exposes the offenders to “aggressive public notification of their crimes” and causes “profound humiliation
and community-wide ostracism.”34 As further justification of her
opinion, Justice Ginsburg compared the requirements of the registry
with those associated with a lifetime parole.35 She recognized the
registry’s civil purpose—to promote public safety—but thought that
the registry’s “scope notably exceeds this purpose.”36 Justice Ginsburg stated that the registry “applies to all convicted sex offenders,
without regard to their future dangerousness.”37 This opinion justifies the need to reform the registry in order to protect JCSOs from
the punishment inherent with being on the registry. Justice Ginsburg
agreed that the registry is a punishment and that it may be too harsh
a punishment for certain sexual offenders. In agreement with Justice
Ginsburg, I argue that the registry can be beneficial for promoting
public safety, but that its punitive nature makes it too harsh for certain sexual offenders such as JCSOs.
Justice Stevens shared the same opinion as Justice Ginsburg,
expressed in his dissent. He wrote of the “severe stigmatizing effect”
of the registry.38 He cited some provisions of the registry in the Alaskan Act that may be too intrusive for some of the offenders on the

33

Id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). (Justice Ginsburg stated that she realizes that the court has also deemed some laws non-punitive, despite their
punitive aspects, she quoted United States v. Urse, 518 U.S. 267, 290,
1996).
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Id. at 115 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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See id. at 115 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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Id. at 116-17 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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registry.39 Most importantly, Justice Stevens established a definition
of what is a punishment. He states that the registry is a punitive
action because “the sanctions (1) constitute a severe deprivation of
the offender’s liberty, (2) are imposed on everyone who is convicted
of a relevant criminal offense, and (3) are imposed only on those
criminal.”40 In his opinion, Justice Stevens considers the registry a
punishment.
Informing the public of sex offenders in their neighborhood, in
accordance with Megan’s Law, is also a punishment. This harms
potential relationships that JCSOs could make with those in their
communities, which further displaces them from rehabilitation and
creates an atmosphere for vigilantism. A study conducted in 2000
among sex offenders in Wisconsin discovered that most sex offenders interviewed were harassed, ostracized, or humiliated on a regular basis, and all of them feared for their safety.41 In extreme cases,
some of those registered had been physically attacked by members
of their communities overly concerned with a sex offender living in
their neighborhood.
The punishment associated with registration is cruel to sex
offenders, but it is exacerbated by the familial punishment that

39

See id. at 111-112 (Steven, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote: “In
Alaska, an offender who has served his sentence for a single, nonaggravated crime must provide local law enforcement authorities with extensive
personal information, including his address, his place of employment, the
address of his employer, the license plate number and make and model of
any car to which he has access, a current photo, identifying features, and
medical treatment at least once a year for 15 years. If one has been convicted of an aggravated offense or more than one offense, he must report
this same information at least quarterly for life. Moreover, if he moves, he
has one working day to provide updated information. Registrants may not
shave their beards, color their hair, change their employer, or borrow a car
without reporting those events to the authorities.”
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Id. at 112 (Steven, J., dissenting).
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See Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Increase Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, 1, J. Sex
Offender Civ. Commitment: Sci. & L. 141, 143 (2006).
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comes with it.42 This is especially poignant for JCSOs because they
are not dangerous citizens and are more likely to have normal sexual
and familial relationships.43 Their innocent family members are punished by the sex offender registration notification process and the
humiliation associated with it. A 2009 study found that not only do
few family members of registered sex offenders (4% of the population surveyed) find the registration effective in helping the public to
protect itself, but most family members are affected adversely by the
notification laws, even though they were not the people who committed the crime.44 The majority of families experienced financial
hardships because of sex offender laws, and most respondents were
also forced out of their homes. Many had also been threatened or
harassed because of their family member’s status as a sex offender.
The injustice of this is irrefutable. It is obvious that this form of
punishment goes beyond retribution for just the sex offender; their
family members often pay a price as well.45 Families of convicted
murderers or other heinous crimes would suffer similarly, but the
suffering the sex offenders’ families experience and the magnitude
of the family members’ crime is not proportional.
Notification laws become even more worrisome when one considers the effects those laws have on the children of sex offenders. In
42

See Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registration, 21 Journal Of Contemporary Criminal Justice 67 (2005).
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See Robert A Prentky, Austin F. S. Lee, Raymond A. Knight & David
Cerce, Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological Analysis, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 635 (1997).
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See Jill Levenson et. al., Collateral Damage: Family Members of Registered Sex Offenders, 34 Am. J. Crim. Just. 54 (2009).
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See id at 54. (82% of the respondents said that a financial hardship had
been created for their family because the registered sex offenders had such
difficulty in finding a job. 53% said that the registered sex offender in their
family had been fired because of their sex offender status, which created
more financial hardship for their family. 51% said that they had to move
from their residence because someone (either a landlord or a neighbor)
found out that a sex offender lived there. A shocking 44% of respondents
said that they had been threatened or harassed by neighbors after it was
discovered a family member was a sex offender).
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the same 2009 study, it was obvious that children were affected by
stigmatization that occurs because of their parents’ crimes.46 When
one considers that sometimes the children themselves are the victims of these crimes, it seems especially cruel that they are made to
suffer. Most of these children have been stigmatized by their parents’ sex offender status, and adults more often than not treat these
children differently. The consequences that they experience are not
just restricted to actions taken by adults, however; most children
of sex offenders are treated differently by other children. The sex
offenders’ children should not be ostracized as a result of their parents’ crimes.47
The registry further penalizes the sex offender who has served
out his or her punishment.48 The registry disables and restrains the
sex offender from progressing to a new and rehabilitated life. He or
she is constantly reminded of past mistakes and is ostracized by the
community because of the registry.

The Registry Cruel and Unusual Punishment for JCSOs
I have found the registry to be unconstitutional for JCSOs
because the registration process is a cruel and unusual punishment,
in violation of the Eight Amendment.49 Because Megan’s Law
helps protect the public from violent sex offenders, the registry does
fulfill its purpose for dangerous sex offenders. JCSOs were convicted
of statutory rape that was consensual, therefore their action could
not have been rape; use of force must be present for these actions

46

See id. at 54.
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See id. at 54. (The study reveals that 71% of the children of registered
sex offenders have been stigmatized by their parents’ status, and 63% are
treated differently by other adults. The consequences that the children
experience are not just restricted to actions by adults, however; 58% of respondents with children said that their child is treated differently by other
children at school, and 78% claim that their child’s friendships have been
impacted).
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Id. at 54.

49

See U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
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to be considered rape.50 I conclude, then, that JCSOs are not violent
offenders and the registry is unconstitutional when applied to them.
The registration process is comparable to a lifetime parole.
For example, in the state of Utah, convicted sex offenders have to
meet with local law enforcement agencies to update their residential
information and vehicle registration, among other things.51 The most
serious sexual offenders have to meet with authorities every three
months. Parole, on the other hand, is no more than an extension of
their incarceration; it is granted to those imprisoned that have had
good behavior, to serve out the rest of their sentence at home under
the supervision of local authorities. Those under parole have to meet
with parole officers regularly to prove that they are being rehabilitated and improving their behavior.52 In reference to Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent, the registry is simply a parole.53 Sex offenders who serve
their full sentence in custody, upon being released, have to meet with
local authorities regularly. There is no functional difference between
these meetings and parole. The registry is cruel and unusual punishment because it is excessive in punishment and is not proportional to
such a mild offence of having consensual sex with a minor.
The Supreme Court has established that excessive punishment
for a crime is considered “cruel and unusual.” In Coker v. Georgia,
a prisoner who was found guilty of murder, rape, kidnapping, and
aggressive assault escaped from prison and again sexually assaulted
a woman.54 The defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to
death by a jury, which was later held up by the Georgia Supreme Court.
The defendant then appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court. In the case addressing the defendants appeal, the decision
was overturned by a 7-2 vote with the Court arguing that the punishment of death constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court
50
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See id. Title 77 Chapter 27, available at http://corrections.utah.gov/services/sonar.html.
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See Parole Definition, Dictionary.law.com, http://dictionary.law.com/
Default.aspx? selected=1451 (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
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concluded that proportionality of punishment to crime is a part of
cruel and unusual punishment:
(a) The Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments
that are “barbaric” but also those that are “excessive” in relation to the crime committed, [and] a punishment is “excessive” and unconstitutional if it ... is grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crime.55
This case established a precedent of punishing criminals with sentences that are proportional to the crime committed. Even in a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist also
accepted the Eighth Amendment’s concept of proportionality,
though they did not believe the death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment to rape.
When applied to other violent sex offenders, the registry is a
punishment, but a deserved one. These sex offenders are dangerous
to society and exposure to children could be a dangerous temptation
and detrimental to their rehabilitation. According to the legislation,
the purpose of Megan’s Law is “to protect the public concerning a
specific person required to register.”56 Because JCSOs are not violent
and did not commit any heinous crime towards a minor, they do not
deserve this punishment.

Proposal
There are many issues that arise from the sex offender registry,
and many amendments have been passed for the Sexual Offender
Act of 1994 aimed at improving its effectiveness. The Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety act of 2006 is an amendment that some
states have ratified that increased the effectiveness of the registry.
For non-serious offenders (classified by the act as Tier-1 offenders),
the limit to the number of years that a sex offender has to register is
15 years. For more serious crimes, the number of years required to
55
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Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 170101(1994).
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register is greater. This and other acts have been ratified to further
the effectiveness of a much-supported public service.
However, more needs to be done to ensure that the punishment
fits the crime and that the registry serves its purpose. A large part of
the purpose behind punishing sex offenders is to help these people
move on from their mistakes, and become productive and law-abiding citizens. I propose that the federal government require every state
to pass Romeo and Juliet Laws that will protect young, consensually
intimate couples. It would be left to the state to decide what ages fall
under the Romeo and Juliet Law, but every state should implement
these laws. Lastly, if every state were to ratify the Adam Walsh Act,
there would at the very least be a limit to the number of years that
JCSOs would have to register, thus limiting the long-term effects the
registry can have on individuals. The legislation for the registry has
good intentions, but it can be detrimental to JCSOs. Continuing to
improve the already amended laws will help ensure that the registry
fulfills its intended purpose.

